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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction in this case is conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (h) (1986) in that it 
was transferred to the Court of Appeals from the I Jtah Supreme 
Court, to which the appeal was initially sought by the Board. 
Jurisdiction also appears to be conferred upon this Court 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 782A-3 (2) .986) in that it 
involves an appeal from a district court review of a final order 
or decree of a state agency. However, in a similar appeal, the 
language of the Utah Supreme Court in its discussion of the 
jurisdictional issues in Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis 
County Board of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159 (Ui ill I 1985), creates some 
question as to whether such a challenge to Board rulemaking would 
fall within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (a) 
(1986). In that action, the Court explained that the district 
court's jurisdiction to review the rulemaking decisions in that 
action arose only under the Declaratory Judgment Act and not 
under Sections 26-24-20 (4), (5) and (6) of the Act, The Court 
emphasized: 
It is the Board's "final determination' in such a 
matter that subpart (5) permits the courts to review at 
the instigation of either the department or the 
complaining party. Since this case involves only a 
challenge to the Board rulemaking, Section 26-24-20 (5) 
cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction. 709 P. 2d at 
1161. 
However, whether under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2A-3 (2) (a) 
or (h), jurisdiction has been properly conferred upon this Court 
to review this case. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This case involves an action for declaratory judgment 
brought by plaintiffs-respondents (hereinafter referred to as 
"plaintiffs'1) in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County to 
determine the validity of certain "fees" imposed by the Salt Lake 
City-County Board of Health (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Board") pursuant to a certain "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standard" adopted by the Board. The respective 
parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for 
Determination (hereinafter referred to as the "Stipulation") 
together with various Exhibits, which was submitted to the Court. 
Each party submitted its respective Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Memoranda in support of its Motion and in opposition to the 
opposing Motion, seeking the Court's determination based upon 
those facts and documents. The Court issued its Ruling in the 
form of a minute entry on June 24, 1987 (R. 166-167), and after 
various objections were heard and resolved, the Court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 191-197) and Judgment 
(R. 198-200) on August 18, 1987. In view of their central 
importance to the resolution of this matter, the Stipulation and 
its attached Exhibits, as well as the District Court's Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment are attached hereto 
as portions of the addendum to this Brief. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes are set forth in full in 
plaintiffs1 addendum to this Brief and include Utah Code Ann. 
Sees. 26-24-14, 26-24-18 and 26-24-20 from the Local Board of 
Health Act, together with Utah Code Ann* Sec- 26-1-6 and Sec. 
10-8-80. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As earlier reflected, this case was presented to the Court 
upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination (R. 46). 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law by the Board (R. 73-
74) were included as Exhibits to the Stipulation. While 
stipulating that those Findings were entered, however, the 
plaintiffs did not stipulate that the Findings accurately 
reflected the existing facts. In fact, plaintiffs have 
emphasized that no evidence supporting any of the dollar costs of 
the food inspection program or amounts to be produced from the 
license fees were ever presented upon the record, except through 
the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law themselves. 
The only items of ^ testimony, documents, papers, Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, or Orders of the Board regarding the 
proposal for the adoption of the licensing fee standard were 
reflected in the Exhibits attached to the Stipulation (R. 49, 
Para. 7). 
Those Exhibits accurately reflected the times, places, and 
purposes, as well as all actions taken, comments made, and other 
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input given at the public hearing. Due and proper notice of the 
public hearing on the licensing fee standard was given by the 
Board (R. 53-54) and a public hearing was conducted on September 
10, 1986, by a Board-appointed hearing officer from the Health 
Department (R. 60-65). A copy of the proposed Standard was made 
available as part of the Notice to the public by the Board prior 
to that public hearing (R. 55-59). Approximately thirty persons 
attended the public hearing. No member of the Board or the local 
health department was present, other than the hearing officer. 
At that public hearing, all of the testimony and comments were 
adverse to the adoption of the proposed licensing fee standard. 
No testimony nor evidence of any sort was presented by the Board, 
the department, nor its hearing officer in support of the 
adoption of that standard (R. 60-65). Persons attending the 
meeting were informed that a summary of the hearing and written 
comments would be submitted to the Board before its regular 
meeting on October 2, 1986, and that interested parties could 
attend that meeting and make additional comments before the Board 
if they desired. 
The meeting held on October 2, 1986, was a regular meeting 
of the Board and not a "public hearing" within the meaning of 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981). The required notice for 
such a "public hearing" was not published regarding that meeting. 
At that time, the Board had before it a summary of the comments 
from the earlier public hearing, written comments from the public 
and Health Department staff prepared subsequent to the public 
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hearing (R. 75-79), and proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R. 73-74), as well as the licensing fee standard. 
Further oral comments were invited from the private parties and 
staff in attendance. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board 
voted to implement the licensing fee standard, whereupon the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were executed (Draft of 
Record of Board Meeting, R. 66-72). 
The dollar amounts, categories and definitions applied to 
those categories as reflected in the licensing fee standard were 
prepared by, and adopted based upon the recommendations of, the 
Health Department staff. The Board's determination that the 
dollar amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable was 
based upon the recommendations of that staff and the Board's own 
deliberations, without any public input in regard to those dollar 
amounts, categories or definitions (R. 50, Para. 10). 
The inspections contemplated in the standard constituted no 
change from previously conducted inspections, except that those 
inspections were paid with Health Department funds (R. 49, Para. 
8). 
The licensing fee standard established fee categories and 
fee amounts ranging from $15.00 to $100.00 per year, based upon 
factors including the number of service bays, the number of 
seats, the number of square feet in the establishment, and 
whether it was a food service/ food establishment, a day care 
center, or a nursing home. (R. 55-59). 
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Following the adoption of the licensing fee standard, 
plaintiffs filed this action for a declaratory judgment to 
determine the validity of the licensing fee standard. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff's arguments in this appeal may be summarized as 
follows: 
POINT I. There is no statutory authority for the imposition 
of the licensing fees attempted to be imposed by the defendant. 
(a) Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-14 (14) (1981) was not 
intended by the legislature to grant the Board authority to 
impose licensing fees. It was only intended to authorize 
imposition of charges for such minor items as preparing 
certificates, copying fees and similar services to 
particular persons for their specific benefit, such as have 
been traditionally imposed by governmental bodies. 
(b) Absent such statutory authority, the Board has no 
inherent power to charge any fees. 
(c) The granting of the power to the Board to adopt 
rules, regulations and standards and to conduct health 
inspections does not imply power to impose fees to cover the 
costs of their services, particularly where the legislature 
has specifically provided other methods of financing those 
inspections through appropriations from the general fund, 
the levy of a tax or from local, state or federal funds, as 
provided by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-16 (1987). 
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(d) Even though disallowing such fees may cause 
increased taxation, the legislated means of financing those 
services should be given effect. 
(e) The "wide latitude of discretion" to be given the 
Board as an administrative tribunal has no effect upon the 
Board's lack of statutory authority to impose the license 
fees involved in this case. 
(f) Where the record is devoid of any support for the 
Board's Findings, "wide latitude of discretion" should not 
be applied to fill that void. 
POINT II. The licensing fee standard is a tax, not a fee. 
(a) The licensing fee standard is a revenue raising 
measure with no reasonable relationship to the cost of any 
increased service. 
(b) The licensing fee standard provides no 
"demonstrable benefit" to the food establishments. It 
merely continues inspections which were previously 
conducted without charge. 
(c) The benefit of the inspections is to the public, 
not to individual food establishments. 
(d) There is no uniformity among, and no valid basis 
for the unequal treatment of, the various classifications of 
food establishments as reflected in the licensing fee 
standard. 
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(e) The licensing fee standard improperly attempts to 
divide food establishments into various component parts to 
provide additional fund raising bases. 
POINT III. The Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law were not supported by evidence presented at the public 
hearing. 
(a) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
statutorily mandated by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981). 
(b) Where such Findings are mandated, they must have 
some support in the record, or the legislative mandate 
serves no purpose. 
(c) There is no support for the Findings of the Board 
from the record of the public hearing on September 10, 1986. 
(d) The meeting of the Board on October 2, 1986, was 
not such a mandated "public hearing". 
(e) The Board, in adopting the licensing fee 
standard, relied solely on staff input and on its own 
personal judgment, neither of which was produced at the 
public hearing. 
(f) There is no evidence or information in the record 
supporting the various categories of the licensing fee 
standard, the actual cost of the food inspection program for 
such categories or as a whole, the amount which would be 
produced by such inspections, or the rationale behind having 
one-third of the cost of the entire program borne by 
inspection fees. 
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(g) Findings of Fact, supported upon the record of a 
public hearing, serve a valid purpose in establishing the 
basis for the Order and in assuring the public an effective 
opportunity for determining the accuracy of input, rebutting 
inaccurate input, verifying presentations, and explaining 
concerns regarding the bases alleged as support for such 
order. 
(h) Findings of Fact, supported by the record of a 
public hearing, further serve a valid purpose in meeting 
previous Utah Supreme Court pronouncements that an 
administrative body must disclose the bases of its 
calculations to persons challenging the reasonableness of 
fees, so that compliance with the various statutory and 
constitutional standards can be ascertained by a reviewing 
court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE BOARD DOES 
NOT HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENACT THE FEE SCHEDULE 
EMBODIED IN ITS FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
Utah Code Ann. Title 26, Chapter 24, provides for the 
establishment and operation of local health departments. Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-16 (1987) declares that funding for the 
establishment and operation of those departments is to be 
appropriated from the General Fund, from the levy of a tax or 
from local, state or federal funds. Notwithstanding that 
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provision, the Board adopted the licensing fee standard involved 
in this action, imposing certain charges to ". . • pay a portion 
of the Salt Lake City-County Health Department's reasonable 
expenses of inspecting and enforcing State and local food rules 
and regulations." (R. 55). 
As reflected in those standards, the Board specifically 
relied upon Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-14 (14) (1981), which 
provides the powers and duties of local health departments: 
(14) Establish and collect appropriate fees, to 
accept, use and administer all federal, state or 
private donations or grants of funds, property, 
services or materials for public health purposes, and 
to make such agreements, not inconsistent with law, as 
may be required as a condition to receiving such 
donation or grant. . . 
The Board contends that this subsection creates statutory 
authority allowing it to impose inspection fees, and asserts that 
its actions are no different than those of the State Health 
Department which charges fees for various permits. The State 
Health Department's authority to impose such fees was established 
by Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6 (1981), part of the same act that 
established the local health departments. However, that 
authority of the State Department of Health was granted subject 
to very guarded restrictions: 
The department may adopt a schedule of fees that may be 
assessed for services rendered by the department, 
provided that such fees shall be reasonable and fair 
and shall be submitted to and approved by the legis-
lature as part of the department's annual appro-
priations request . . ." Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-1-6 
(1981). 
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Both the specific grant of authority and the specific 
requirement for legislative review are conspicuously absent in 
relation to the local boards of health. It seems unreasonable 
that the legislature would give local health departments the 
carte blanche to impose inspection fees, such as those claimed by 
the Board, while carefully limiting the powers of the State 
Department of Health to impose similar fees. In order to provide 
a reasonable meaning to all applicable sections, the more 
reasonable interpretation is that the provision allowing the 
local health departments to impose fees was intended only to 
grant powers similar to those of other governmental bodies to 
impose ministerial or clerical fees for preparing certificates, 
making copies or other services specifically requested by a party 
and which benefit that party, not the public in general. 
Unless Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-14 (14) (1981) is 
interpreted as legislative authorization for imposition of "fees" 
such as those imposed in the present case, the Board has no power 
or authority to impose those fees. The Utah Supreme Court has 
heretofore declared in reference to a similar inspection fee 
program by a similarly established local Board of Health, ". . . 
the Board has no inherent power to charge fees or levy taxes of 
any kind. Any such authority must be conferred on it by the 
county which created it, acting within its lawful authority, or 
by the legislature." Utah Restaurant Association v. Davis County 
Board of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159, 1161 (Utah 1985). The Supreme 
Court did not reach a determination of the issue of whether or 
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not the fees actually constituted a tax or could properly be 
imposed by a local Board of Health since it determined that the 
Board failed to properly promulgate the fee schedule, which was 
dispositive of the case. No statutory authority for imposition 
of such fees was cited by the Court nor do the provisions of the 
act creating the local boards of health (Utah Code Ann, Title 26, 
Chapter 12) reflect statutory authority for the Board's attempt 
to offset substantial portions of the cost of its operations, 
including salaries and overhead of various programs, through the 
imposition of such "fees". 
However, the Board argues, the Supreme Court's failure to 
specifically find that such fees may not be imposed, buttresses 
their position, since the Court did explain, by way of dicta, 
that should a similar fee regulation be attempted by the Board in 
the future, it would be "well advised to do so in careful 
compliance with the procedures required by the Local Health 
Department Act." Utah Restaurant Association, supra, at 1161. 
However, the Court did not attempt to specify all of the factors 
to be considered to determine the validity of any such fees. It 
merely indicated that there were certain factors which should be 
considered in determining whether charges were "fees" or "taxes". 
The Court gave no indication that it was attempting to overrule 
the long line of authorities relating to the powers of such 
boards to impose fees. It also did not overrule the lower 
court's determination that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-14 (14) 
(1981) was intended to authorize charges for: 
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(S)uch minor items as preparing certificates, copying 
fees, and similar fees for specific services to 
particular persons for their specific benefit, such as 
have been traditionally imposed by governmental bodies. 
In view of the Supreme Court's emphasis that the Board has 
no "inherent power" to charge any fees, the mere generalized 
power of the Board or local health department to make public 
health inspections should not be deemed adequate authority to 
impose fees to cover the cost of inspections. Neither should the 
Board's power to adopt rules, regulations and standards to 
promote the public health under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 
(1981) be interpreted as granting such authority. 
Plaintiffs recognize that decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court, such as Provo City v. Provo Meat Packing Company, 49 Utah 
528, 165 P. 477 (1917); Best Foods v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 
285 P. 1001 (1930); and Salt Lake City v. Bennion Gas & Coal Co., 
15 P. 2d 648 (Utah 1932), have found that the power to impose a 
"license fee or a license tax" is within the police powers of the 
state to regulate or prohibit a business and that inherent in 
those powers is the power to tax for the cost of such regulation. 
However, those cases arose out of the taxing powers of the 
governing body, which the Board does not possess. Further, it is 
respectfully submitted that such inherent powers to charge for 
the costs of regulation are inapplicable to situations where the 
legislature has specifically set forth the manner in which 
funding is to be secured, as in the present case. The 
legislature provided that local boards are to be funded from the 
General Fund, from the levy of a tax, or from local, state or 
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federal funds. There is no basis for implying a right to impose 
a fee to cover the costs of services of local boards. In Hill v. 
City of Eureka, 35 C.A. 2d 154, 94 P. 2d 1025, 1027 (1939), the 
California Court was confronted with a similar situation where 
the legislative charter to a city expressed its right Mto provide 
for licensing any and all business not prohibited by law; to 
establish and regulate the issuing and granting of municipal 
licenses and the collection of taxes." The charter further 
provided that the city should "levy the taxes upon all property, 
both real and personal, in the city, necessary to raise 
sufficient revenue to carry on the various departments of the 
municipal government." While recognizing its lack of authority 
to license attorneys, the city attempted to impose a license fee 
upon them to raise revenue to help fund its operations. The 
Court explained: 
The charter expressly designating the source from which 
sufficient revenue shall be raised for the operation of 
the city, it would seem unnecessary to raise additional 
money from another source. ' It is an elementary rule 
of construction that the expression of one excludes the 
other.1 (citing cases). 94 P. 2d at 1027. 
The Court further noted that the body seeking to impose the fee 
did not have the general power "to license for the purpose of 
revenue and regulation." Even for counties, the right to conduct 
inspections implies no right to exact a tax merely for revenue. 
See Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Salt Lake 
County, 702 P. 2d 113 (Utah 1985); and Consolidated Coal Company 
v. Emery County, 702 P. 2d 121 (Utah 1985). In the present case, 
the Board imposed fees to fund its inspection operations when it 
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did not possess the power to tax or to license for the purpose of 
revenue and regulation. The promulgation of those fees was not 
within the statutory authority of the Board and is invalid. 
Plaintiffs do not contest the power of the legislature to 
grant statutory authority to the Board to impose appropriate fees 
for specific services rendered. Plaintiffs merely contend the 
legislature has not granted the Board authority to impose 
inspection fees. Plaintiffs recognize the import of user fees 
and, in some circumstances where appropriate, the legislature has 
determined that such fees are authorized to fund certain types of 
limited operations. However, the legislature has not authorized 
the imposition of such fees by the Board to offset costs of its 
food inspection programs. 
The Board argues that if this Court should determine it has 
no authority to impose such fees, it would effectively eliminate 
11
 ...vital . . . programs financed in part through fees, with the 
only alternative being massive tax increases." This argument 
should not sway the Court where the legislation specifically 
contemplates additional taxation as the source of funding for the 
local boards. See Utal^  Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-16 (1987). Further, 
as the Utah Supreme Court has explained, that argument is more 
properly addressed to the legislature. In Consolidated Coal, 
supra., in invalidating license fees imposed by the county, the 
Court explained: 
. . . (I)f it is necessary or desirable for counties to 
raise revenues through licensing taxes, some limits 
should exist to prevent some inequitable distributions 
of the tax burden among a few businesses. The 
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Legislature is better equipped to devise such 
limitations and to accommodate the competing interests 
of counties and local businesses than the courts. 
702 P. 2d at 126. 
See also Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph v. Salt Lake 
County, 702 P. 2d 113 (Utah 1985). 
Neither should the "wide latitude of discretion" argument 
affect the Court's decision. The general rule grants such a 
presumption of validity to any administrative or judicial 
tribunal, and properly so. However, that same rule applies to the 
appellate review of those cases cited in Point III of this Brief. 
As more fully explained therein, Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law must still be supported by evidence upon the record, or 
the action of the lower tribunal cannot stand. 
It is respectfully submitted that the District Court 
properly ruled that the Board did not have statutory authority to 
enact the fee schedule embodied in its Food Service/Food 
Establishment Licensing Fee Standards. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE LICENSING FEE 
STANDARD AS IMPOSED BY THE BOARD IS A TAX NOT A FEE 
In adopting its Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing 
Fee Standards, the Board found the fee schedule necessary to 
provide general revenue to cover a portion of the cost of its 
food inspection program. The record reflects no evidence of any 
reasonable relation between the fees imposed and the services 
rendered and, contrary to the Board's representations, it is not 
"undisputed" that the licensing fee standard will produce 
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revenues in an amount less than the expenses of inspection. The 
figures appear on the record solely in the Board's own Findings 
of Fact, which should have no effect upon the Court's 
determination, as discussed more fully in Point III of this 
Brief. The fees are not for improvement or enhancement of 
services. Rather, the schedule of fees is a revenue-increasing 
measure with no reasonable relationship to the cost of any 
increased services. In fact, it is stipulated that the services 
rendered to food establishments will not be increased as a result 
of the fee standard but, rather, will remain at the same level as 
the previous inspections. Further, the fee imposition provides 
no demonstrable benefit to plaintiffs, was not requested by 
plaintiffs, provides no uniformity as to the classes on which 
they are imposed, and involves an attempt to divide the 
plaintiffs' businesses into various component parts to provide 
additional fund raising bases. As such, the imposition of those 
fees constitutes a tax. 
In a series of "impact fee" cases regarding subdivision 
developments, the Utah Supreme Court has explained the 
distinction between "taxes" and "fees" and the factors which 
determine that status. In Weber Basin Home Builders v. Roy City, 
26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P. 2d 866 (1971), the Court ruled that the 
"fees" imposed by the city were discriminatory, unconstitutional 
taxes, rather than fees. The city of Roy raised the cost of a 
building permit fee for the purpose of obtaining additional 
revenue for the city. The Court explained: 
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If the money collected is for a license to engage in a 
business and the proceeds therefrom are purported 
mainly to service, regulate and police such business or 
activity, it is regarded as a license fee. On the 
other hand, if the factors just stated are minimal, and 
the money collected is mainly for raising revenue for 
general municipal purposes, it is properly regarded as 
the imposition of a tax, and this is so regardless of 
the terms used to describe it . . . it is reasoned that 
even though license fees sufficient to cover such costs 
are a necessary concomitant of the police power, fees 
in excess thereof are in reality a form of taxation, 
which may not be imposed by the city without the 
express authorization of the legislature. Under the 
undisputed facts as presented to the trial court: where 
the basic flat-fee charge for a building permit was 
increased in one jump from $12 to $112, which increase 
admittedly had no relationship to increased costs of 
the service rendered; and more importantly, where the 
declared purpose was to raise general revenue for the 
City, . . . the increase placed a disproportionate and 
unfair burden on new households in Roy City, as 
compared to the old ones, in the maintenance of the 
City government; and that consequently it was discrim-
inatory and constitutionally impermissible. 487 P. 2d 
at 867. 
In Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 
2d 899 (Utah 1981), the Court further mandated that, in order to 
justify the imposition of a fee, there must be a "demonstrable 
benefit" to the party upon which the fee was imposed and must 
bear some reasonable relationship to the need created by the 
applicant. As the Court explained: 
In remanding the case (Call v. City of West Jordan) for 
trial on the constitutionality of the ordinance as 
applied (i.e., the requirement that seven percent of 
the subdivision land be dedicated), this Court ruled 
that "the dedication should have some reasonable 
relationship to the need created by the subdivision. . 
. . Reasonableness obviously holds the municipality to 
a higher standard of rationality than the requirement 
that its actions not be arbitrary or capricious. Under 
the reasonableness test in Call v. City of West Jordan, 
Supra., the benefits derived from the exaction need not 
accrue solely to the subdivision (614 P. 2d at 1259); 
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flood control and recreation are needs that cannot be 
treated in isolation from the rest of the municipality. 
At the same time, the benefits derived from the 
exaction must be of 'demonstrable benefit* to the 
subdivision (Id. at 1259). 631 P. 2d at 905 (emphasis 
added). 
See also Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P. 2d 271 (Utah 1979), 
on reh. 614 P. 2d 1257 (Utah 1980). 
In further discussions of the "impact fee" cases, the Court 
in Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P. 2d 375 (Utah 1982), noted the 
distinction as to whether the fees were valid "fees" or invalid 
"taxes" hinged on the basis that: 
A reasonable charge for a specific service is 
permissible, whereas a general fee that amounts to a 
revenue measure is not. * * * The validity of a fee 
imposed to augment general revenues is determined by 
its legal status at the time it is exacted, without 
regard to how the funds are later allocated or spent. 
In the present case, the Board acknowledged it has no power 
to tax and yet it has imposed a "fee" with no showing of any 
reasonable relationship to the cost of the services rendered and 
with no showing of any demonstrable benefit to the food 
establishments in return for the "fee". The Board made no 
suggestion of increasing its services to the food establishments; 
and the parties have stipulated that the inspections in the fee 
schedule would constitute no change from the previous 
inspections, "except that the previous inspections were paid with 
Health Department funds." (R. 49, Para. 8). Even if the Board 
had the power to tax, an imposition such as in this case would 
constitute an abuse of that power in that it is merely raising 
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revenue for general purposes without providing specific 
additional benefits. 
In Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Farmington City, 599 P. 
2d 1242 (Utah 1979), the City of Farmington imposed a fee on 
Lagoon, ostensibly with an intent to apply the increased revenues 
to upgrade the services to Lagoon. However, no dedication of the 
revenue funds were made for that specific purpose and the Court 
held the ordinance invalid, explaining: 
The conclusion is inescapable that a situation such as 
the one at hand, where a municipality imposes a 
potentially crippling tax on a single business for the 
benefit of the community as a whole, coupled with vague 
promises of improved services which the business has 
not been guaranteed, and to a large extent, does not 
need, presents such a case of abuse of taxing power. 
599 P. 2d at 1246. 
In the present case, an imposition of charges by the Board, 
whether called "fees" or "taxes", is similarly an abuse of the 
Board's powers. This situation lacks even a vague promise of 
improved services to the food service entities but only benefits 
the community as a whole. The services provided by the Board 
were not requested by the food service entities but, rather, are 
actions mandated by state and local law to protect the interests 
of the public at large. The restaurants and other food 
establishments must undergo the inspections or lose their permit 
to operate. Notwithstanding the Board's claims that these 
inspections may help protect plaintiffs from lawsuits by the 
public, the sole benefit of those services are to the public. 
The public does not know when or if a food establishment has been 
inspected and the number of inspections conducted on such an 
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entity hinges more on its compliance with the health code than on 
the number of chairs or cash registers it maintains. If 
inspections bestow any benefits upon a food establishment, those 
benefits are, at best, only incidental. The public receives the 
benefit, turning the "fee" imposed by the Board into a tax 
promulgated through an abuse of power. 
The United States Supreme Court has similarly found that a 
benefit to the general public does not justify the imposition of 
fees only upon certain entities by the administrative agency 
performing the services. In National Cable Television 
Association v. United States, 94 S. Ct. 1146, 415 U.S. 336, 39 L. 
Ed. 2d 370 (1974), the Court reversed the lower court's holding 
of the validity of certain FCC "fees" where Congress had required 
administrative agencies to charge for their services through the 
enactment of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1952, 
31 U.S.C. Sec. 483a. That act provided, in part: 
It is the sense of the Congress that any work, service 
. . . benefit, . . . license, . . . or similar thing of 
value or utility performed . . . by any Federal agency 
. to or for any person . . . shall be self-
sustaining to the full extent possible, and the head of 
each Federal agency is authorized by regulation . . . 
to prescribe therefor . . . such fee . . . if any, as 
he shall determine . . . to be fair and equitable 
taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to 
the Government, value to the recipient, public policy 
or interest served, and other pertinent facts . . . 
Based thereon, the FCC sought to impose a revised fee schedule 
for CATV systems by estimating its direct and indirect costs for 
CATV regulation and then, while retaining its earlier imposed 
filing fees, added an annual fee for each CATV system at $0.30 
21 
per subscriber, on the basis that this would meet its annual 
costs and approximate the "value to the recipient" as required by 
that Act. The Court, with two dissenting votes, explained the 
distinction between taxation and fee levying powers, as follows: 
Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which 
is the sole organ for levying taxes, may act 
arbitrarily and disregard benefits bestowed by the 
Government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to 
pay, based on property or income. A fee, however, is 
incident to a voluntary act, e. g., a request that a 
public agency permit an applicant to practice law or 
medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast 
station. The public agency performing those services 
normally may exact a fee for a grant which, presumably, 
bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by other 
members of society. 
* * * 
There is no doubt that the main function of the 
Commission is to safeguard the public interest in the 
broadcasting activities of members of the industry. If 
assessments are made by the Commission which are 
sufficient to recoup costs to the Commission for its 
oversight, the CATV's and other broadcasters would be 
paying not only for benefits they received but for the 
protective services rendered the public by the 
Commission. 
* * * 
While those who operate CATV's may receive special 
benefits, we cannot be sure that the Commission used 
the correct standard in setting the fee. It is not 
enough to figure the total cost (direct and indirect) 
to the Commission for operating a CATV unit of 
supervision and then to contrive a formula that 
reimburses the Commission for that amount. Certainly 
some of the costs inured to the benefit of the public, 
unless the entire regulatory scheme is a failure, which 
we refuse to assume. 415 U. S. 337-338. 
In the present case, the local board of health's main 
function is similarly to safeguard the public interest and 
health. By imposing a portion of the costs of its operations 
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upon the food establishments, those establishments are forced to 
pay for the protective services rendered to the public by the 
Board. However, unlike the CATV operators, the food 
establishments have not sought licenses from the Board to operate 
but have already obtained business licenses allowing their 
operation. Under these circumstances, the charges embodied in 
the fee standard amount to the imposition of an impermissible tax 
by the Board. 
Even if the charges imposed by the Board under the licensing 
fee standard were to be otherwise deemed to be "fees", the lack 
of any basis for the unequal treatment of the various classes 
would render those charges "taxes". In Smith v. Carbon County, 
90 Utah 560, 63 P. 2d 259 (1953), the Utah Supreme Court rejected 
a graduated probate fee schedule based upon the dollar amounts 
involved in the probate: 
That fees may be charged for services rendered in 
probate proceedings is not questioned. From what we 
have said, we do not wish to be understood as holding 
that the Legislature must fix fees payable in all 
probate proceedings the same. What we do hold is that 
the amount of fees that may be exacted must bear some 
reasonable relation to the extent and nature of the 
services rendered. Otherwise such fees are, in 
contemplation of law, taxes. 63 P. 2d at 263. 
Whether technically denominated "license fees" or "taxes", 
Utah Code Ann. Section 10-8-80 (1953) requires all such charges 
to be uniform with respect to the classes upon which they are 
imposed. Classes must be composed of all persons similarly 
situated, with equal treatment for all members of each such 
class. Otherwise, the charges are arbitrary and 
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unconstitutional. As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Cache 
County v. Jensen, 21 Utah 207, 61 P. 303 (1900): 
Neither the constitution nor the statute authorizes. . 
ordinances to tax citizens arbitrarily and 
unjustly, by license which confers no privilege that 
was not previously enjoyed, and which has no view to 
regulation. Unjust and illegal discrimination between 
persons, in taxation, and the denial of equal justice, 
are within the prohibitions of the constitution of this 
state, and of the United States. * * * The law abhors 
inequality and lack of uniformity in taxation whether 
the burden be imposed by license or by levy and 
assessment. 61 P. at 304. 
In this case, in addition to the failure to bear a 
reasonable relationship to the costs of any "service" to be 
rendered, the lack of any "demonstrable benefit" to those upon 
whom the fees are imposed, the lack of any request for the 
service by plaintiffs, and the lack of uniformity of the fees, 
the licensing fee standard further attempts to divide the 
business of those food service establishments into various 
component parts to provide additional fund raising bases, which 
constitutes an abuse of power by the Board. As the Utah Supreme 
Court explained in Provo City v. Provo Meat Packing Co., 49 Utah 
528, 165 P. 477 (1917) : 
A municipal corporation cannot by ordinance under the 
delegated general power to tax privileges, segregate 
the several elements of right that accrue to the 
citizen under one taxable privilege, as recognized, 
defined and declared by law, and tax each of such 
elements as a separate and distinct privilege of its 
own creation, as, for example, by dividing several 
privileges into many and requiring separate licenses to 
sell special articles which necessarily belong to one 
legal privilege, and which the law permits to be sole 
under one license. To express the rule in other words, 
power to impose a license tax upon a business does not 
authorize a division of the business into its 
constituent elements, parts, or incidents, and levy a 
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separate tax on each or any element, part or incident 
thereof. 165 P. at 479 (citing 3 McQuillan Municipal 
Corporations, Sec, 1003). 
The food establishments are subject to licensure to operate, 
with fees imposed to cover the cost of regulating their 
operations. Food establishments are charged one license "fee" to 
operate, which necessarily involves the preparation and service 
of food; another "permit fee" to sell the food; and another "food 
handler fee" for authorizing persons to handle the food. The 
governing bodies and the local boards of health are attempting to 
divide the food service business into its constituent parts for 
the purpose of securing additional revenue. As reflected in the 
cases cited above, such a division is not permissible and renders 
such action invalid. 
The District Court properly ruled that the licensing fee 
standard as imposed by the Board is a tax and not a fee. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT THE BOARD1S FINDINGS 
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MUST BE SUPPORTED BY SOME 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE PUBLIC HEARING 
The legislature has specifically required local boards of 
health to make Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law after a 
public hearing. Utah Code Ann. Section 26-24-20 (1981) provides: 
(1) The board may adopt rules, regulations and 
standards, not in conflict with the rules of the 
department, necessary for the promotion of public 
health, environmental health quality, injury control 
and the prevention of outbreaks and spread of 
communicable and infectious diseases, that shall have 
the effect of law . . . 
(2) The board shall provide public hearings prior to 
the adoption of any rule, regulation or standard . . . 
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(3) The hearings may be conducted by the board at a 
regular or special meeting, or the board may appoint 
hearing officers, who shall have power and authority to 
conduct hearings in the name of the board at a 
designated time and place. A record or summary of the 
proceedings of any hearing shall be taken and filed 
with the board, together with findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, and the order of the board or 
hearing officer. 
A public hearing and its resultant Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are legislative requirements to insure that 
the public is given an opportunity to confront, and oppose if 
they desire, the bases and grounds upon which the Board is 
considering particular action. The evidence presented at the 
hearing must substantiate those Findings and Conclusions or the 
mandate for a public hearing is rendered meaningless. The Board 
is not bound by all of the evidence so presented, but the 
Findings of Fact must have some support in the evidence so 
presented and the district court properly so determined. Whether 
in the form of Findings from an administrative agency or a 
judgment of a lower court, they must show that the Judgment 
"follows logically from, and is supportable by, the evidence." 
See Smith v. Smith, 726 P. 2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986). 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981) contemplates that the 
party conducting the public hearing take and file with the Board 
a summary of the proceedings, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and its order based thereon. As earlier 
reflected, only one "public hearing" was held in this matter, on 
September 10, 1986. The hearing before the Board itself was not 
26 
a "public hearing" within the meaning of that Act, as reflected 
by the Board's failure to publish notice of that hearing, as 
required under Utah Code Ann* Sec, 26-24-20. At the hearing on 
September 10, 1986, there was no information presented to justify 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law subsequently entered 
by the Board. Further, the person entering the Findings and 
Conclusions was not present at the hearing, nor was any member of 
the Board (R. 48-49, 60-65). The Board ignored the purposes of a 
public hearing and, as stipulated by the parties: 
The dollar amounts, categories and definitions applied 
to those categories as reflected in the "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and 
fee schedule were prepared by, and adopted based upon 
the recommendations of, the Health Department staff. 
The staff indicated, and the Board determined based 
upon the recommendations of staff and their own 
deliberations, that those dollar amounts, categories 
and definitions were reasonable. There was no public 
input regarding those dollar amounts, categories, and 
definitions. (R. 50, Para. 10) 
Rather than having a member or the chairman present at the 
public hearing, the Board elected to use a hearing officer to 
conduct the hearing, as it properly could under the Utah 
statutes, and copies pf the proposed fee schedule were made 
available to everyone present. Members of the public attending 
the hearing were allowed to voice their comments as to the 
proposal, but no presentation was made by the Board or its staff 
showing the bases upon which the schedule was derived, the 
differences in cost of inspection of the various establishments 
or any other information necessary to determine the 
reasonableness of the fee schedule (R. 60-65). 
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The record reflects that the Board simply read the 
legislative mandate for a public hearing and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as mere technicalities and adopted the 
suggestions of its staff. The reasonableness of the 
classifications and conclusions embodied in the fee schedule were 
not considered. The staff apparently indicated that they felt 
the fee schedule was reasonable so the Board adopted it (R. 50, 
Para. 10) with no consideration given to: 
1. The actual costs of inspections as opposed to other food 
service programs; 
2. The effects of cash registers, drive-up windows, or 
other points where food is dispensed, upon the costs of 
inspections; 
3. The effects of increased numbers of seats upon the costs 
of inspections; 
4. The proportionate benefit from the inspection program to 
the public in general; 
5. The increased benefits to be received by the restaurants 
and food establishments; or 
6. The means of dedicating funds obtained for the purpose 
of the inspection program to insure that the funding obtained 
from the program could not be used for other Board operations or 
programs. 
These issues, together with other vital issues, should have 
been fully and completely considered by the Board at the public 
hearing. The public should have been given an opportunity to 
provide input and ask questions regarding the imposition of the 
fee standards. The Board satisfied neither the letter nor the 
spirit of the law in holding a public hearing but based its 
Findings and Conclusions on evidence submitted by Board members 
and staff prior to the hearing and that was not submitted to 
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public review. The record is wholly devoid of support for the 
Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, since the Board 
relied solely on staff input and its own personal judgment in 
adopting the licensing fee standard, none of which was placed 
into evidence at the public hearing. In fact, no evidence 
whatsoever was presented by either the Board or its staff at that 
public hearing (R. 60-65). No evidence or information regarding 
the actual cost of the food inspection program for each category 
was presented nor was any consideration given to the effect of 
the taxes and other licensing fees paid from food establishment 
operations. No evidence appears to explain the rationale behind 
the contention that one-third of the cost of the food inspection 
program should be borne by inspection fees. The written "Staff 
Response'1 was prepared and submitted to the Board after the 
public hearing (R. 75-79). On October 2, 1986, a regular meeting 
of the Board was held, wherein L. Jed Morrison, chairman, signed 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which adopted the fee 
schedule. The Findings and Conclusions were based solely on the 
opinions of the Board staff and reflected a total lack of input 
from the public or even any opportunity for the public to 
question the staff input (R. 66-72). In short, none of the 
information involved in the fee standard arose out of the public 
hearing. Public input as to the reasonableness of the fees was 
not considered, and no basis upon which the public could review 
that reasonableness was provided, although the burden of 
29 
establishing the reasonable basis and foundation for the 
imposition of the fees was on the Board. 
To allow Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Board to stand without any basis in the record would be to render 
the legislative mandate for a public hearing meaningless. While 
the Utah Supreme Court recognized that these provisions regarding 
Findings of Fact were generally associated with the adjudication 
of a claim and that the purpose of the requirement for such 
Findings of Fact for these hearings was not clear, nevertheless, 
the Court emphasized that the law clearly required Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to be entered. See Utah Restaurant 
Association, Supra. Having determined that such Findings of Fact 
are mandated, that mandate must be interpreted in a meaningful 
manner. The Utah Supreme Court has stressed the importance of 
interpreting a statute in a meaningful manner: 
It is to be observed, moreover, that statutory 
enactments are to be so construed as to render all 
parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and that 
interpretations are to be avoided which render some 
part of a provision nonsensical or absurd. 
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P. 2d 934 (Utah 1980). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 26-24-20 (1981), the 
legislature has required a public hearing when a board of health 
engages in rule-making or adoption of standards, with resulting 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The statute must be 
interpreted in a meaningful manner which necessitates that the 
Findings of Fact be supported by evidence presented at a public 
hearing. To do otherwise, would render the mandate meaningless. 
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Plaintiffs do not contend that all rule-making actions by 
administrative bodies must be based upon evidence produced upon 
the record of the hearing where such rules are adopted. Indeed, 
as reflected in Utah Restaurant Association, supra., the 
provisions of that section are somewhat unusual. However, at 
least where Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are mandated 
by a finder of fact after public hearing, regardless of the 
nature of that administrative body, the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law must be substantiated by evidence upon the 
record. 
An administrative body has a primary obligation to base its 
determinations on evidence and information introduced at a public 
hearing. Basic hornbook law prohibits it from basing its 
decision upon its own knowledge, secret staff input, or other 
evidence outside of the record, as was done in this case. 
Indeed, it is a denial of due process or of the 
fundamentals of a trial or hearing for an 
administrative agency to reach a decision on evidential 
facts not spread upon the record and upon information 
secretly collected and not disclosed, which the party 
complaining had no opportunity to examine or analyze, 
explain, or rebut. 
2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law, Section 444. To the same 
effect, see 73A C.J.S., Public Administrative Law and Procedure, 
Section 126; and 18 A.L.R. 2d, Administrative Law - Evidence, 
Section 3. 
Utah's courts have s teadfas t ly enforced t h i s ru le of law in 
regard to adminis t ra t ive agencies. In a case involving the 
denial of an appl ica t ion to discontinue the operation of an 
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agency railroad station, the Utah Supreme Court allowed the 
Commission to consider common facts of life formed from common 
knowledge and to take judicial notice of such universal facts, 
but with limitations: 
It cannot take its special knowledge which it may have 
gained from experience or from other hearings and base 
any findings or conclusions upon such knowledge. That 
is fundamental. * * * The commissions cannot act on 
their own information. Their findings must be based on 
evidence presented in the case, with an opportunity to 
all parties to know of the evidence to be submitted or 
considered, to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect 
documents and to offer evidence in explanation or 
rebuttal, and nothing can be treated as evidence which 
is not introduced as such. 
Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 17 P. 2d 
287, 291 (Utah 1932) . 
Similarly, in a case involving a decision of the Industrial 
Commission, the Court insisted: 
(I)t is fundamental that in investigations such as the 
Industrial Commission is authorized to make, any party 
to a cause or proceeding is entitled to be advised of 
and afforded an opportunity to meet such evidence as 
the commission may consider and rely on in the making 
of its findings and decision. Unless such evidence is 
brought into the case, and in some lawful manner made a 
part of the record, it cannot be regarded as competent 
evidence, and must be excluded in determining the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings . . 
(Citations omitted.) 
Spencer v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P. 2d 618, 620 
(1933). See also Clearfield State Bank v. Brimhall, 24 Utah 2d 
339, 471 P. 2d 161 (1970) (review of order of the Financial 
Institutions Commissioner for a unit bank in Clearfield, Utah); 
State of Utah in the Interest of Pilling v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 
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407, 464 P. 2d 395 (1970) (court's consideration of a social file 
not introduced at a hearing was a denial of due process of law). 
The Alaska Supreme Court has expressed the purposes of the 
requirement that the facts found by an agency be based upon 
evidence in the record in City of Fairbanks v. Alaska P.U.C., 611 
P. 2d 493 (Alaska 1980) : 
First, it helps to ensure that the agency does not make 
decisions that have no adequate basis in fact; second, 
it gives opposing parties the opportunity to challenge 
the agency's reasoning process and the correctness of 
the decision; and third, it affords reviewing courts 
the opportunity to evaluate the decision. 
The Alaska Court then applied the facts of the case to the 
purposes of the requirement, explaining that where the evidence 
was not divulged at the hearing, the opponent had no way of 
knowing the contents of the evidence and: 
. (N)o opportunity to subject it to the tests of 
cross examination or other means of verification, no 
opportunity to rebut it, and no opportunity to argue 
that the staff's conclusion did not logically follow 
from the information on which it was based. Likewise, 
neither this court nor the superior court can evaluate 
the Commission's conclusion without the underlying 
information. These fundamental defects amount to a 
failure of due process. 611 P. 2d at 495. 
As earlier reflected, in the present case, the Board's fee 
standards were prepared from the personal knowledge and input of 
its members and staff. Although persons attending the hearing 
were allowed to voice their opinions concerning the imposition of 
the fee standards, they were not provided with evidence of the 
need for the standards, the cost of inspection programs, the 
effect of business license fees in offsetting those costs, why 
fees needed to be charged when they had not been previously 
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charged, the methods used in determining the amounts or 
categories contained in the Standards, or any other substantive 
evidence. Similarly, they were denied an effective opportunity 
for rebuttal, verification or explanation regarding the bases of 
the Board's actions, with no opportunity to address the 
competency, sufficiency, or accuracy of the input considered by 
the Board. The hearing was apparently intended to satisfy what 
the Board considered to be a mere technicality of the Code, not 
to secure any valid input nor to allow the public to ensure that 
evidence was competent, sufficient and accurate. Since the 
Board's Findings and Conclusions are not supported by evidence 
within the record, a reviewing court has no means to evaluate the 
determinations of the Board. 
In cases involving "impact fees", "building permit fees", 
and other charges imposed by various cities to help offset their 
"growing pains" due to rapid population growth, the Utah Supreme 
Court has required that regulations imposing fees must meet 
certain standards. The Court explained: 
Since the information that must be used to assure that 
subdivision fees are within the standard of reasonable-
ness is most accessible to the municipality, that body 
should disclose the basis of its calculations to 
whoever challenges the reasonableness of its sub-
division or hookup fees. Once that is done, the burden 
of showing failure to comply with the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness in this matter is on the 
challenger. 
Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan City, 631 P. 2d 899, 
904 (Utah 1981). See also Lafferty v. Payson City, supra, and 
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Home Builders Association of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo City, 28 
Utah 2d 402, 503 P. 2d 451 (1972). 
The reasonableness of the fees being imposed by the Board 
were challenged by the public at the hearing and in written 
comments received by the Board prior to the hearing. However, 
the Board did not disclose any basis of its calculations nor was 
anyone from the Board even present at the hearing. 
Notwithstanding the lack of information at the hearing, one of 
the Board's Findings of Fact was that " (W)hile objection was 
raised by several individuals as to the charging of the fees, no 
information was brought forward which demonstrated that the 
proposed fees . . . was not tied directly to the cost of the 
inspection program and to be used to support this cost." This 
Finding reflects that the Board improperly viewed its burden of 
determining the reasonableness of the fee schedule prior to its 
adoption. 
The Board failed to meet its specific burden of showing the 
bases upon which the reasonableness of the proposed fees could be 
determined. The chairman of the Board proceeded to adopt the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to a hearing at 
which neither he nor any other member of the Board was present, 
without any consideration for challenges from the public. The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from that public hearing 
thus became a meaningless gesture which did not fulfill the 
legislative mandate. The hearing officer appointed by the Board 
should have provided Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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together with a summary of proceedings justifying the order 
embodying the fee standards. The hearing officer did not comply 
with his statutory duties and the Board had no reasonable 
justification for the imposition of the fee schedule. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law promulgated by 
the Board were arbitrary and capricious since they were wholly 
without evidentiary support in the record. Vital issues of 
material fact were not resolved through the process mandated by 
the legislature and those fundamental defects render the Findings 
and Conclusions and order adopting the fee standard invalid. The 
District Court's ruling that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law must be supported by evidence on the record should be 
upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court properly determined that the Board had no 
statutory authority, nor any inherent authority, to impose fees 
for inspections of food establishments as it attempted to do 
under its licensing fee standard. That court properly determined 
that the fee standard constituted a tax, rather than a fee, since 
it was a general revenue raising measure which benefited the 
public and the community as a whole, rather than the specific 
food establishments against whom it was imposed. The fee 
standard was also determined to be a tax because of the lack of 
any request for inspections by the food establishments, the lack 
of uniformity of the fees imposed, the lack of any basis on the 
record for the establishment of the various classes and the 
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unequal treatment of those classes, and the fact that those 
standards amounted to a division of the business of the food 
establishments into various component parts in an attempt to 
provide additional funding bases. That court also properly 
determined that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
relied upon by the Board were defective and invalid since they 
had no support in the record of the public hearing. Based 
thereon, the District Court properly ruled that the licensing fee 
standard was invalid and void, restraining the Board from 
imposing any further charges and ordering the refund and return 
of payments it had previously received from plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the decision of the 
District Court was correct and should now be affirmed by this 
Court. 
ATKIN & ANDERSON 
By 
Gary E. >tk'in 
Attorp^'ys for Plaintiffs 
^ " 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the (S? day of January, 1988, 
eight copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents were filed 
with the Utah Court of Appeals and two copies were mailed to 
Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, 2001 South State 
Street, #S3600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200. 
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ADDENDUM TO RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
10-8-80. License fees and taxes. 
They may raise revenue by levying and collecting a license 
fee or tax on any business within the limits of the city, and 
regulate the same by ordinance; provided, that no Utah city or 
town shall collect a license fee or tax hereunder from any 
solicitor or salesman who solicits, obtains orders for or sells 
goods in such city or town solely for resale; and no enumeration 
of powers of cities contained in this chapter, shall be deemed to 
limit or restrict the general grant of authority hereby 
conferred. All such license fees and taxes shall be uniform in 
respect to the class upon which they are imposed. 
26-1-6. Fee schedule adopted by department. 
The department may adopt a schedule of fees that may be 
assessed for services rendered by the department, provided that 
such fees shall be reasonable and fair and shall be submitted to 
and approved by the legislature as part of the department's 
annual appropriations request. Such fees shall be paid into the 
state treasury in accordance with Section 63-38-9. 
26-24-14. Powers and duties of departments. 
* * * 
(14) establish and collect appropriate fees, to accept, use 
and administer all federal, state, or private donations or grants 
of funds, property, services, or materials for public health 
purposes, and to make such agreements, not inconsistent with law, 
as may be required as a condition to receiving such donation or 
grant; 
• • • 
26-24-18. Health department fund - Sources - Uses. 
The treasurer of a health department shall, on organization 
of the department, create a health department fund to which shall 
be credited any moneys appropriated or otherwise made available 
by participating counties, cities, or other local political 
subdivisions and any moneys received from the state, federal 
government, or from surpluses, grants, fees or donations for 
local health purposes. Any moneys credited to this fund shall be 
expended only for maintenance and operation of the local health 
department and claims or demands against the fund shall be 
allowed on certification by the health officer or other employee 
of the local health department designated by the board. 
Gary E. Atkin, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-2552 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah non-profit corporation, 
et al., FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiffs, 
C i v i l No. C 8 6 - 9 0 2 4 
V. (JUDGE MOFFAT) 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY 
BOARD OF HEALTH, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Judge, presiding; and plaintiffs being represented by their 
counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by 
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney; and the parties having submitted the matter to the 
Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination; 
both parties having submitted their Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities and Reply Memoranda in support of their respective 
positions; and the matter having been fully argued to the Court; 
and the Court having reviewed the Memoranda, as well as the 
pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues, and other 
AUG i n il!87 
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documents filed of record; and the Court now being fully informed 
in the premises, does hereby make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff associations, the Utah Restaurant Association, 
Utah Retail Grocer's Association, and Utah Hotel-Motel 
Association, are non-profit corporations, duly organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with their 
principal places of business in Salt Lake County, and whose 
memberships are composed of persons, corporations, partnerships, 
and other entities engaged in, associated with, or having a 
direct interest in the restaurant and food service industry in 
the state of Utah, whose memberships includes numerous persons 
whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County, and which 
are subject to the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing 
Fee Standards" (the "fee standard") involved in this action. 
Each of those associations is a person within the meaning of 
Utah's Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah 
Code Anno. (1953), as amended, and Utah's Administrative 
Rulemaking Act, Section 63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. 
(1953), as amended. Each plaintiff is entitled to the relief 
sought under those Acts. 
2. The remaining plaintiffs are also persons subject to, 
and whose legal relations are affected by, the fee standard and 
are persons within the meaning of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 
Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended, as 
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well as within the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Section 
63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended. 
3. The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health (the "Board") 
is a non-elected body, appointed by the Salt Lake City and County 
Commissioners to act as a local board of health pursuant to the 
provisions of Sections 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
as amended, which provisions specify the statutory powers and 
duties of the Board. 
4. The Board, as a separate body, is amenable to suit and 
is subject to the jurisdiction and process of this Court, 
pursuant to Sections 63-46a-13, Utah Code Anno. (1953), as 
amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as 
amended. 
5. This is an action brought by plaintiffs pursuant to the 
provisions of the aforesaid Sections and Rule 57, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, for a declaratory judgment to determine the 
validity and constitutionality of the "Food Service/Food 
Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" adopted by the Board. 
6. The exhibits attached to the Stipulation of the parties, 
as subsequently supplemented by the parties, reflect all meetings 
of the Board relative to the fee standard and the times, places 
and purposes of those meetings, as well as all actions taken, 
comments made, and other input presented at those meetings, and 
all notices thereof, which were considered in the formulation of 
the Board's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relative to 
the adoption of the fee standard. 
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7. Except as referred to in Paragraph 6, there are no other 
items of testimony, documents, papers. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, or Orders of the Board regarding the proposal 
and adoption of the fee standard. 
8.• The inspections contemplated in the fee standard 
constitute no change from the inspections previously conducted, 
except that previous inspections were paid with Health Department 
funds. 
9. Fees collected by defendant pursuant to the fee standard 
have not been expended but have been deposited into a Health 
Department fund and are reflected, for bookkeeping purposes, as a 
credit to a separate discretionary Health Department account, 
which does not reflect deposits from any other source. Defendant 
intended that this account would be used to pay for a portion of 
the food inspection program or, if the court should so direct, to 
provide a refund to the persons making the payments. 
10. The dollar amounts, categories and definitions applied 
in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" 
were prepared and adopted based upon recommendations of the 
Health Department staff. The Board made its determination, based 
upon the recommendations of staff and its own deliberations, that 
the dollar amounts, categories and definitions were reasonable. 
There was no public input regarding those dollar amounts, 
categories and definitions. 
4 
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11. There are no existing genuine issues as to any material 
fact relevant to this action which would require an evidentiary 
hearing. 
BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court does 
hereby make and order the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant does not have the authority to impose charges 
as specified in the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing 
Fee Standards" for food service establishments pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
or otherwise. Section 26-24-14 (14), Utah Code Anno. (1953) 
refers only to the charging of fees for such minor items as 
preparing certificates, copying fees, and similar fees for 
specific services to particular persons for their specific 
benefit, such as have been traditionally imposed by governmental 
bodies. The statute does not authorize defendant to attempt to 
offset substantial portions of its total costs, including 
salaries and overhead involved in particular programs, through 
the imposition of such charges. Therefore, since defendant was 
acting in excess of its statutory authority in attempting to 
impose those charges, they should be declared to be invalid, and 
null and void ab initio. 
2. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as adopted 
by defendant are unsupported by the evidence presented at the 
public hearing of September 10, 1986, relative to the adoption of 
its "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" for 
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food service establishments. While the Court recognizes that 
defendant is not bound by the evidence presented at such public 
hearings, the Findings of Fact mandated by Section 26-24-1, et 
seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953), should have some support in the 
evidence so presented. Therefore, the standard imposing the 
charges should be declared invalid, and null and void ab initio. 
3. The provisions of the "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standards" amount to a tax. The Board is not 
authorized to levy taxes and, therefore, the standard should be 
declared to be invalid, and null and void ab initio. 
4. Any charges previously collected by defendant based upon 
the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" 
were improperly assessed and should be returned to plaintiffs and 
others paying the same. 
5. Defendant should be restrained from assessing further 
charges pursuant to the "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee Standards^""' 
Dated this / f day of [ L^sH<*rtS > 1987 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Counsel for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the office 
of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, County Complex, 
2100 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, this 3rd 
day of August, 1987. ^ 
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Gary E. Atkin, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
185 South State Street, Suite 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-2552 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, 
a Utah non-profit corporation, JUDGMENT 
et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY 
BOARD OF HEALTH, 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Judge, presiding; and plaintiffs being represented by their 
counsel, Gary E. Atkin, Esq., and defendant being represented by 
its counsel, Thomas L. Christensen, Esq., Deputy Salt Lake County 
Attorney; and the parties having submitted the matter to the 
Court upon a Stipulation of Facts and Issues for Determination; 
and both parties having submitted their Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities and Reply Memoranda in support of their respective 
positions; and the matter having been argued to the Court; and 
the Court having reviewed said Memoranda, as well as the 
pleadings, affidavits, Stipulation of Facts and Issues and other 
400 (<L OiAotZ^C^ 
Civil No. C86-9024 
(JUDGE MOFFAT) 
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documents filed of record; and the Court having heretofore made 
and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and the 
Court being fully informed in the premises, now, therefore: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the "Food Service/Food 
Establishment Licensing Fee Standards" adopted by defendant are 
declared invalid, and null and void ab initio. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be, and hereby is, 
restrained from attempting to impose any further charges pursuant 
to the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee Standards". 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant be, and hereby is, 
ordered to refund and return any payments previously received 
from any of the plaintiffs pursuant to the "Food Service/Food 
Establishment Licensing^Fee Standards". 
Dated this / 0 day of u 4 c ^ c # ^ T 1987. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
f/iu\u^ i-- CJwv^n^— 
f a t 
J u d g e 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
e y — ^ Q c a 
Counse l fo r Defendan t Deputy Clerk 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a copy of the 
foregoing Judgment to the office of Thomas L. Christensen, Deputy 
County Attorney, County Complex, 2100 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84105, this 3rd day of August, 1987. 
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Gary E. A t k i n , SBN 144 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i t r s 
185 S o u t h S t a t e S t r e e t , # 4 0 0 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 8 4 1 1 1 
( 8 0 1 ) 5 2 1 - 2 5 5 2 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, a 
U t a h n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION, 
a U t a h n o n - p r o r i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
UTAH HOTEL-MOTEL ASSOCIATION, a 
U t a h n o n - p r o f i t c o r p o r a t i o n , 
LAMB'S RESTAURANT, FLYING "J" 
UTAH FOOD & CATERING, I N C . , DEES 
FAMILY RESTAURANTS, KENTUCKY 
FRIED CHICKEN-HARMON'S MANAGE-
MENT CORP. , GASTRONOMY, I N C . , 
TACO MAKER, I N C . , MARKET STREET 
GRILL, MARKET STREET BROILER 
NEW YORKER RESTAURANT, HILTON 
HOTELS-PEARSON ENTERPRISES, 
SIZZLING PLATTER, I N C . , STAN'S 
MARKET, N. P . S . , CRYSTAL 
PALACE MARKET, WHEEL-IN MARKET, 
THE TABLE SUPPLY, VOYLES 
MARKET, THE STORE, ALBERTSON'S 
I N C . , FAMILY MARKET, SAFEWAY 
STORES, I N C . , THE TANNING 
EXPERIENCE, O. P . SKAGGS # 1 , 
SAB ENTERPRISES, 8TH AVE. 
MEAT AND GROCERY, MACEY'S, 
I N C . , BELL'S 48TH S T . MARKET, 
PETERSON FOODTOWN, FOOD-4-LESS 
DAN'S FOODS, MONTIE'S BESTWAY, 
AND HALE'S MARKET, 
P l a i n t i r r s , 
- v s -
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY BOARD OF 
HEALTH, 
STIPULATION OF FACTS AND 
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION 
Civil No. CBb-902^ 
Honorable Judge Moffat 
Defendant. 
COME NOW the parties to the above-entitled matter, by 
and through their counsel ot record and do hereby stipulate and 
agree as tollows: 
1. Plaintiff Associations, the Utah Restaurant 
Association, Utah Retail Grocer's Association, and Utah 
Hotel-Motel Association, are non-profit corporations, duly 
organized and existing under the laws or the State of Utah, 
with their principal places ot business in Salt Lake County, 
and whose memberships are composed or persons, corporations, 
partnerships, and other entities engaged in, associated with, 
or having a direct interest in, the restaurant and food service 
industry in this state, whose memberships include numerous 
persons whose businesses are operated within Salt Lake County, 
and which are subject to the "Food Service/Food Establishment 
Licensing Fee" standard involved in this action. Each of those 
associations is a person within the meaning of Utah's 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code 
Anno. (1953), as amended and Utah's Administrative Rulemaking 
Act, Section 63-46a-l, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as 
amended, ana each plamtiit is entitled to the reliet sought 
thereunder. 
2. The remaining plaintiffs are also persons suoject 
to, and whose legal relations are atrected by, the "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standaard and Fee 
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Schedule involved herein and are persons within the meaning or 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, Sections 78-33-1, et seq. Utah 
Code Anno. (1953), as amended, as well as within the Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, Section 63-46a-l, et seq., Utah 
Code Anno. (1953), as amended. 
3. The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health 
(heremai'ter referred to as the "Board") is a non-elected body, 
appointed by the Salt Lake City and County Commissioners to act 
as a local board of health pursuant to the provisions of 
Sections 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), as amended, 
whose statutory powers and duties are speciried therein. 
4. The Board, as a separate body, is amenable to suit 
and is subject to the jurisdiction and process or this Court, 
pursuant to Sections 63-46a-13, Utah Code Anno. (1953), as 
amended, and Section 78-33-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
as amended. 
5. This is an action brought by the piaintirfs pursuant 
to the provisions or the aforesaid Sections and Rule 57, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, for a declaratory judgment to 
determine the validity and constitutionality ot the "Food 
Service/Fooo Establishment Licensing Fee" standard adopted by 
the Board and which is the subject of this action. 
6. Exhibits "A" through "H", which are attached hereto 
and, by reference, made a part hereon, accurately reflect ail 
meetings or the Board relative to the standard and ree schedule 
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specitied therein, which is the subject matter of tins action 
and accurately set forth the times, places, and purposes of 
those meetings, as well as ail actions taken, comments made, 
and other input on that topic at those meetings, and all 
notices thereof, which were considered in the ultimate 
rormulation or the Board's Findings or Fact and Conclusions or 
Law relative to the adoption ot the standard and tee schedule, 
as included within those Exhibits. 
7. Except as referred to in Paragraphs 6 there are no 
other items ot testimony, documents, papers, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions ot Law, or Orders ot the Board regarding the 
proposal tor the adoption ot the standard and fee schedule 
which is the subject ot this action. 
d. The inspections contemplated in the aroresaid 
standard and tee schedule would constitute no change trom such 
inspections previously conducted, except that those previous 
inspections were paid with Heath Department runds. 
9. Fees collected to date pursuant to the "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and fee 
schedule have not t>een expended for any purpose but have been 
deposited into a health department rund and are retlected, tor 
bookkeeping purposes, as a credit to a separate discretionary 
Health Department account, which does not reiiect deposits rrom 
any other source. It is intended that this account would be 
used to pay tor a portion of the rood inspection program or, if 
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the Court should so direct, to provide a reiund to the persons 
paying the same, 
10. The dollar amounts, categories and derinitions 
applied to those categories as reflected in the "Food 
Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" standard and ree 
schedule were prepared by, and adopted based upon the 
recommendations or, the Health Department stari. The stall-
indicated, and the Board determined baseu upon the 
recommendations of stait and their own deliberations, that 
those dollar amounts, categories and definitions were 
reasonaole. There was no public input regarding those dollar 
amounts, categories, and definitions. 
11. This action is one which requires the immediate 
attention or this Court and an immediate hearing in the 
interests or all parties concerned, in that irreparable harm 
may result to either or both parties absent such immediate 
deterinmation ot the Court, unless the Court's time is rurther 
encumbered with a hearing on a temporary restraining order or 
injunction. It appearing that there are no remaining issues of 
material iact to preclude a determination on the issues or law 
by tins Court, it is respecttully submitted that there is no 
need to delay the ultimate hearing herein, with the resulting 
necessity of a hearing on a temporary restraining order or 
injunction. 
-b-
BASED UPON the toregomg stipulations or tact, the 
parties seek the Decision ot this Court as to the following 
issues of law: 
1. Does the Detendant have the authority to impose 
charges such as those specitied in the standard imposing the 
"Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" and fee 
schedule tor food service establishments, pursuant to the 
provisions ot Section 26-24-1, et seq., Utah Code Anno. (1953), 
or otherwise and, it not, is the standard imposing those 
charges valid? 
2. Did the Defendant comply with the requirements or 
Section 26-24-1, et seq.f Utah Code Anno. (1933), in imposing 
the "Food Service/Food Establishment Licensing Fee" and fee 
schedule tor rood service establishments and, u not, is the 
standard imposing those charges valid? 
3. Are the Findings or Fact and Conclusions ot Law by 
the Board (Exhibit "E"), supported by any evidence presented at 
the hearings on this matter and, it not, is the standard 
imposing those charges valid? 
4. Do the provisions of the "Food Service/Food 
Establishment Licensing Fee" and tee schedule amount to a 
"tax", rather than a "fee"? If so, the parties stipulate that 
the standard is not valid. 
Counsel do further stipulate and agree that they shall 
rile their mutual Motions for Summary Judgment and supporting 
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Memoranda, based upon the foregoing Stipulation within two 
weeks from the date of execution of this Stipulation and, that 
they shall file any desired responsive Memoranda within one 
week arter service of their opponent's Motion and Memorandum, 
so as to allow consideration by the Court of tins matter and 
soon arter May 29, 1987, as will meet with the Court's Schedule 
and, by way or this Stipulation, move the Court ror such an 
accellerated hearing date. / ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS r DAY O F y ^ ^ ^ 1987. 
:Km, Esq. 
for Plaintiffs 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
*uux •/ mt4Z_ 
Thomas L. Christensen, Esq. 
Attorneys tor Defendant 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
«!»>-
SALT LAKE E $ CITY-COUNTY 
HEALTH ^ D E P A R T M E N T 
610 South 2nd East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: 530-7500 • 
HARRY L. GIBBONS, M.DM M.P.H. 
Director 
NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING 
L. tied Morrison, M.D. 
Chairman 
CO. Clark. DOS. 
Vice Chairman 
Craig E. Peterson 
Crty Government 
M. Tom Shimizu 
County Commissioner 
Robert A. Angle 
John M. Sevan, D.D.S. 
James Davis, Mayor 
South Sart Lake 
Janet R. Green 
Wilfred Higashi, Ph.D. 
Cindy Gust-Jensen 
LaRell D. Muir, Mayor 
Murray City 
Rulon Simmons, M.D. 
Lawrence P. Smith, Mayor 
Sandy City 
Jer\ Taylor 
Sandra K. Ercanbrack 
Secretary 
Before the Salt Lake City-County Board of 
Health 
In the matter of proposed annual fees to be charged for 
inspections Of POOD ESTABLISHMENTS
 r FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, 
AND ESTABLISHMENTS FOR IKE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD 
PRODUCTS. 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
Please take notice that the Salt Lake City-County Board of Health will 
conduct a public hearing for the purpose of receiving cannents and 
reccrrmendations concerning proposed annual fees to be charged for 
inspection Of FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS, FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, AND 
ESTABLISHMENTS FOR THE PROCESSING OF MEAT AND MEAT FOOD PRODUCTS. 
Authority to charge the said fees is embodied in Section 4.2 of the 
respective said regulations of the Salt Lake City-County Health 
Departanent, pursuant to Section 26-24-14 (14), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
Copies of the full text of the proposed fee charges are new available 
for public inspection at the Salt Lake City-County Health Department 
Building, 610 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Ov )&?* 
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A hearing for the purpose of obtaining carments concerning the 
proposed fee charges has been scheduled for September 10, 1986, 
10:00 a.m., at the Salt Lake City-County Health Deparlnent 
auditorium, 610 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
Representatives of food establishments, food service establishments, 
establishments for the processing of meat and meat food products, 
hospitals, nursing homes, correctional institutions, day care centers, 
and the general public within or outside Salt Lake County are 
invited to appear and present their views relevant to the proposals. 
Oral statements will be accepted at the hearing, but, for accuracy 
of the record, written statements are encouraged and will be 
accepted at the time of the hearing or prior thereto. 
Statements or questions should be addressed to: Eugene Devenport, 
Proposed Fee Charges, Salt Lake City-County Health Department, 
610 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. Telephone 
number (801) 530-7525. Statements will be accepted if received 
on or before September 10, 1986, 5:00 p.m. 
OVA)'-
POOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
This Standard is adopted this day 
of , 1986, by the Salt Lake City-County 
Board of Health, a local board of health organized pursuant 
to Section 26-24-9, U.C.A. (1953). 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, it has become necessary to establish a 
fee schedule for food/food service establishments in Salt Lake 
County to pay a portion of Salt Lake City-County Health Depart-
ments reasonable expenses of inspecting and enforcing 
State and local food rules and regulations : and 
WHEREAS, the Salt Lake City-County Health Department 
is authorized to adopt this standard pursuant to Section 
26-24-14 (14) U.C.A. (1953), and Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department Regulation No. 4 and No. 5, and No. 6, Food 
Service Establishments and Food Establishments! Sections 4.2. 
NOW, THEREFORE, The Salt Lake City-County Board of 
Health ordains as follows 
Section I. Definitions: 
Food Service Establishments Restaurants, restaurants/clubs, 
restaurants/fast food, cafeterias, 
snack bars/fountains, nursing 
hemes, day care centers, bars, 
lounges, ice cream stores, 
or 
ooo 
Food Establishments -
any pxace wneire iuuu id ^xci*u.cu ouu 
intended for individual portion 
service, whether the consunption is 
on or off the premises or there is 
a charge for the food. This does not 
include private homes where food is 
prepared or served for individual 
family consunption. 
Grocery stores, bakeriesr candy 
factories, bottling plants, convenience 
stores, canning factories, meat 
processing plants, cold storage ware-
houses, food storage warehouses, or 
similar establishments where food pro-
ducts are manufactured, canned, packed, 
processed, stored, transported, prepared, 
sold, or offered for sale. 
Tenporaxy Food Service 
Establishments -
Service Bays -
Seats -
Food Service establishments that oper-
ate at a fixed location for not more than 
14 consecutive days in conjunction with 
a single event or celebration. 
Include, but are not limited to, cash 
register stands, drive-up windows, walk-
up windows, and/or different points from 
which food is dispensed or served to the 
public. Waited tables are not considered 
service bays. 
Seating that is available for the 
public within a food service establishment. 
The number of seats shall be determined 
by the listing on the business license 
application or by physical count by the 
regulatory authority. 
Banquet seating, not used for everyday 
seating, shall not be included in the 
total number of seats. The number of 
beds, in lieu of the number of seats, 
may be used to classify hospitals and 
correctional institutions. 
-2-
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Square Footage - Square footage will be determined 
on the basis of the outside wall 
measurements of the food establishment. 
Section II. Annual Fees. All food service/food establishments 
in Salt Lake County shall be classified according to the following 
criteria into one of six (6) categories for the purpose of 
assessing annual fees: 
Category I $40.00 Day Care centers, nursing hones and food 
service/food establishments providing 
either one service bay or zero to ten 
seats. 
Category II 
Category III 
Category IV 
$60.00 
$80.00 
$100.00 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either two service bays or 
eleven to fifty seats. 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either three service bays 
or fifty-one to seventy-five seats. 
Food service/food establishments pro-
viding either four or more 
service bays or seventy-six or 
more seats. 
Category V (a) $40.00 
(b) $60.00 
(c) $80.00 
(d) $100.00 
Food establishments with under 
2r000 square feet. 
2r000 to 3,000 square feet. 
3,000 to 5,000 square feet. 
5f000 square feet or more. 
Category VI $10.00 flat 
+ $5.00 per 
day (not to 
exceed $35 total) 
Tenporary food service establish-
ments operating fourteen days or 
less. 
Section III. General Provisions: 
1. All fees shall be paid annually and are due 
in advance on the 1st day of January of each year, 
-3- yeOf'- •' 
after the 1st day of July, except under Category VI, the fee for 
the first year shall be at the rate of 50 per cent (50%) of the 
annual fee. No fees, or any part thereof, may be refunded or 
transferred. 
2. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department shall 
attenpt to notify each food establishment/food service estab-
lishment prior to the date an which fees are due of its deter-
mination of category assignment, and the amount of fees 
due. Fees unpaid after forty-five (45) days of the due date 
will be assessed a penalty of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 
amount of such fees which shall be added to the original amount. 
Failure to pay annual fees and additional charges after ninety 
(90) days of the due date may result in revocation or suspension 
of food/food service permits and the right to operate. A twenty-
five per cent (25%) charge will be assessed for each returned check. 
3. Consistent with Health Department Regulations No. 4, 
Section 4.2, and No. 5, Section 4.2, and No. 6, Section 4.2, the 
Salt Lake City-County Health Department shall provide notice and 
opportunity for a hearing to consider or reconsider the revocation 
or suspension of the right to operate due to nonpayment of fees. 
4. In determining food establishment/food service 
establishment categories, the Salt Lake City-County Health Depart-
ment may classify hospitals, correctional facilities, and other 
institutions by seats, beds, or other reasonable criteria. 
Day care centers and nursing hemes will be classified as Category 
I. Food establishments that have multiple units under one roof 
will be classified by square "footage. 
of this standard or the application thereof shall be held to 
be invalid, such invalidity shall not affect the other provisions 
or applications of this standard. The valid part of any 
clause, sentence, or paragraph of this standard shall be given 
independence from the invalid provisions or application and to 
this end the provisions of this standard is declared to be 
severable. 
Section IV. ttiis Standard shall become effective 
fifteen (15) days after its passage. 
APPROVED and ADOPTED on the day and year first above 
written. 
SALT LAKE CClY-OOUNTir BOARD OF HEALTH 
By: 
Chairman 
Voting 
Voting 
Voting 
(0887J) 
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PUBLIC HEARING 
September 10, 1986 
RE: PROPOSED FOOD INSPECTION FEE STANDARDS 
FOR: SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
PRESENT 
Senator Haven Barlow 
Eldon Riding 
Keith Murray 
Spud Warren 
Julie Peck 
Robert Cohne 
Max Fillmore 
James V. Olsen 
Ron Morgan 
Stan Briggs 
Bil Larson 
Dee Jordan 
Earl Hardwick 
Burr Miller 
LaMar Evans 
Fred Ball 
Robert Walsh 
Emalynn Heath 
Stephen Hurt 
Carolyn Masters 
Ken Masters 
Paula Coyle 
Donald Beck 
Michael Berg 
Hersh Ipaktchian 
Ray Ascani 
Joan Perry 
Senator Jack Bangerter 
M. Lindberg 
Lee Hutchinson 
Tom Christensen 
Glenn Austin 
Bryan Gray 
C.J. Santoro 
Keith Comlee 
Howard Stephenson 
Eugene Devenport 
Bill Davis 
Doyle Parton 
Terry Sadler 
REPRESENTING 
Self & Many Legislators 
Flying J Inc. 
Jordan Queen Restaurant 
Flying J Inc. 
Utah Hotel Motel Association 
Self 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Utah Retail Grocer's Association 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Utah Food & Catering 
Stewart Sandwiches 
Dan Glo's Restaurant & Lounge 
Chairman - Salt Lake City Council 
Holiday Inn - Downtown 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce 
Business Enterprise Program 
Business Enterprise Program 
Salt Lake Tribune 
Jimax Lounge 
Jimax Lounge 
Dan Glo's Restaurant & Lounge 
Utah Licensed Club Association 
Holiday Inn - Downtown 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Cedar Lounge 
West Valley City Business License 
Utah State Senate 
Self 
Self 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Afterwordi Restaurant 
Utah Restaurant Association 
Marriott Corporation 
Warren's Restaurant - Roy, Utah 
Utah Taxpayer's Association 
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department 
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department 
Salt Lake City-Co. Health Department 
Hearing Officer 
The deadline to receive written comments was set at Wednesday, 
September 10, 1986, at 5x00 p.m. in the Administration Office 
of the Salt Lake City-County Health Department. ,^ * 
00^ "^ 
Julie Peck, Administrative Assistant for the Utah Hotel 
Motel Association, read and submitted written comments. The 
Association is opposed to any collection of fees for health 
inspections. They find it ironic that the County would require 
period inspections of their restaurants- and then charge for the 
inspection. Ms. Peck stated the restaurants contribute to the 
cost through the fees for food handler permits, business, licenses 
and taxes collected. 
Robert Cohne, representing himself as a private taxpayer, 
strongly opposes the proposed food inspection. Mr. Cohne, a 
former restaurant owner, urged the Health Department to seek 
additional funds to cover the inspections from the County Com-
mission from the current tax base. 
Max Fillmore, President of the Utah Restaurant Association 
(URA), read and submitted written comments. The URA strongly 
objects to the fee and recommended that it not be approved. Mr. 
Fillmore stated the Health Department exists for the benefit and 
protection of the general public and that operating expenses 
should be paid from the general tax fund. The department should 
also consider creative methods of filling the inspection need 
other than increasing staff and assessing special fees. Mr. 
Fillmore suggested that the Health Department should deal 
directly in problem areas and conduct less frequent inspections 
of restaurants with higher scores. 
Burr Miller, representing Holiday Inn - Downtown, stated 
the proposed fees would create a great burden to an already red-
lined restaurant. 
Don Beck, Utah Licensed Club Association, represents the 
111 licensed private clubs in Utah, 54 of which are in Salt Lake 
County. The Association strongly supports the earlier comments 
made by the Utah Restaurant Association and the Salt Lake Area 
Chamber of Commerce in opposing the proposed food inspection 
fees. Mr. Beck stated the fees are an unfair tax against the 
food industry and urged the Health Department not to adopt the 
standards. 
Earl Hardwick, representing the Salt Lake City Council 
District #4, opposes the proposed standards and classified it 
as a user fee. Adoption of the fees would result in nothing but 
a negative economical impact on facilities required to have the 
inspections. The services are to ensure the safety of the 
general public and should be a general funded item. 
Hersh Ipaktchian, URA Legislative Chairman, read and sub-
mitted written comments. Mr. Ipaktchian strongly opposes the 
proposed fee and feels it is another example of government 
singling out a particular industry to solve an in-house budget 
problem. This issue has statewide impact since other Utah 
ooiv-
STATEMENT OF POSITION . 
SALT LAKE AREA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS 
SEPTEMBER 9, 1986 
The Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Board of Governors, in their 
bimonthly meeting held on September 9, 1986, came out unanimously 
against the proposed special fee to finance health inspections. 
It was the consensus of the Board that the present inspections 
are essential to the public health and are a direct benefit to 
the tax payers and residents of this .county. It is a needed service 
to have the inspections, but is discriminatory to expect that the 
inspected facilities should be mandated to pay a fee for such 
service. 
It is our understanding that the duration,.frequency and content 
of the inspections are the direct responsibility, and at the conven-
ience of the City/County Health Department. This arbitrary sched-
uling and frequency presents a burden on the food service industry 
which they should not have to bear. The industry currently pays 
a great deal of property tax to the taxing entities and also pays 
fees for food handlers1 permits. These taxes, coupled with addi-
tional charges such as business licenses and other such charges, 
consitute a true threat to profitability and success. 
Several members of the Board of Governors expressed concern regard-
ing the potential of escalating fees, such as this, aimed at 
'specific businesses already sorely pressed to make a profit. These 
businesses are already paying health taxes and user fees to govern-
ment entities. 
The Board of Governors of the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce 
regards this proposed fee as a tax increase, and we feel that tax 
increases should be dispersed so that they are not "sock it to 
business" taxes. Since all citizens benefit from the inspections, 
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce believes that all citizens 
should assist in bearing the cost of such inspections. 
Sincerely submitted, 
Fred S. Ball 
President and General Manager 
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce 
(j00^£ 
The health inspectors have no more right to inspection fees than the 
firemen do for their inspections. Then what*about the meat 
inspectors, weights and measures, etc* are they all going to follow 
suit? The real issue here is who actually benefits from these 
inspections? The general public is who the health department and 
the other inspectors are protecting. It isn't a matter of whether the 
grocer wants or invites the inspectors into our businesses. We have no 
control over if or when we will be inspected. Therefore, if the 
inspection fee is adopted, it would be conceivable to think they may 
want to increase the inspection frequency or length, after all the 
businesses would be paying for the inspections. What better way to 
justify a fee increase. Let's make sure the people who are getting the 
benefit are paying for the service. If the public wants or needs 
inspections then they will have to be willing to pay the price with thei 
taxes. This is upfront and above board, not another hidden tax which 
the business, if it wants to do business in Salt Lake County, has to paj 
Then the businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing business 
to their customers, through higher prices. The business takes the 
blame for the increase, and the people who are really paying for these 
government services have no understanding or knowledge of what they are 
really paying for. If the health department needs additional revenue 
then they need to go through the proper budgetting process with the cit; 
and county and justify their need to the elected officials and public. 
OOCK<G: 
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UTAH HOTEL MOTEL 
9/10/86 ASSOCIATION 
99 £tcfttnp* H*c*—Suit* 1715 
Uit u*» Citr. ut»h * " n 
I HAVE A STATEMENT TO READ ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE UTAH 
HOTEL MOTEL ASSOCIATION; I AM JULIE PECK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
ASSISTANT THERE. 
WE ARE OPPOSED TO ANY COLLECTION OF FEES FOR HEALTH INSPECTIONS. 
WE FIND IT IRONIC THAT THE COUNTY WOULD REQUIRE PERIOD INSPECTION 
OF OUR RESTAURANTS, AND THEN TURN AROUND AND CHARGE US FOR THAT 
INSPECTION...PARTICULARLY SINCE WE CONTRIBUTE TO THE COST THROUGH 
THE FEES FOR FOOD HANDLERS PERMITS. BUSINESS LICENSES, AND TAXES 
COLLECTED. 
AS AN INDUSTRY WE ARE BEING SINGLED OUT -
-ARE ALL OTHER BUSINESSES WHICH REQUIRE INSPECTIONS GOING TO 
BE ASKED TO PAY FOR THOSE. OR JUST THE FOOD SERVICE INDUSTRY? 
IN ANY CASE. WE CONCUR WITH THE UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION 
THAT THIS IS UNFAIR AND DISCRIMINATORY. AND WE WILL DO WHAT 
IS NECESSARY TO SEE THAT THIS DOES NOT TAKE PLACE. 
ML rriUATEDWITH / * ^ f j O ^ ^ l 
WAN HOTEL & CT^PI 
.ASSOCIATION h i Ld 
The proposed annual fees for Inspection of foodservlce and food-related establishments 
are just another example of government singling out a particular industry to solve an in-house 
budget problem. The issue goes far beyond the size of the fee itself and far beyond the 
proposal in Salt Lake County. • /This issue has statewide impact since other Utah counties 
will follow suit by levying their own fees. We oppose the fee for a major reason. 
The URA has traditionally supported the concept of health inspections as an essential 
service to the public. These Inspections do nothing to help restauranteurs in the operation of 
their business; rather, the whole purpose of these inspections which are required by Utah law 
is to help protect the public from food-borne illness. If such a service is so essential that it 
is required by law for a general public purpose, then that service should be financed through 
general funds, not a specific fee penalizing the restauranteur. If I install a security device 
in my restaurant, I do so for my own protection. It will be silly for me to charge other 
restaurants or businesses for the cost of my own security system, since it benefits me and I 
should pay for i t . It would be equally silly for me to expect a tax credit since the system 
would lessen demands on the local police force. The same reasoning applies to the proposed 
fees: If public services are for the benefit of the public and, In fact , required by law, then 
financing should come from public funds. 
In addition, health departments already receive special monies to offset the costs of 
inspections. Our employees are required by law to pay for food handler's permits. How man; 
other businesses are regulated to the extent that their employees must pay the government 
in order to acquire work? We are already one of the most regulated businesses in the countr 
and we pay a variety of special taxes, assessments and fees on equipment and menu items. 
The fees pile up, and yet, according to a recent National Restaurant Association survey, the n 
profit of an average restaurant is less than 3%. Additional fees and taxes will only reduce 
this percentage while having no positive impact on business. 
If this proposal is adopted, what will we see next? Will counties and municipalities soor 
charge us special fees for fire protection? Will we see special fees for police protection? 
Since some restaurants receive a high traffic volume, will these firms be assessed a special fe 
for highway and road improvement? Everytime there is a budget crunch, will a government at 
rush in to assess a special fee or tax? And how high will the fee go? As businessmen we 
know that a fee of $60 today will soon be increased to $100, then $150, whatever amount is 
needed to solve the government's problem. 
Restaurants are shown to have one of the highest rates of business failure, and the last 
thing government should do is start Increasing taxes by disguising them as a special fee. If 
there is a budgetary problem within the health department, then that department should eithe 
obtain more funding from the general public or tighten its own financial belt. If an individua 
needs more money, he or she works harder or becomes more productive. We believe that 
the health department should do the same. 
MAX FILLMORE, PRESIDENT OF UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, READ A 
STATEMENT IN BEHALF OF THE ASSOCIATION. THAT STATEMENT IS 
ATTACHED HERETO AS EXHIBIT A, AND BY REFERENCE MADE A FART 
HEREOF. 
MR. FILLMORE WENT ON TO EXPLAIN THAT HE FEELS THE FROFOSED 
INSPECTION FEE SCHEDULE IS A VERY IMPORTANT ISSUE. HE DID NOT 
FEEL DETAILED SPECIFICS WERE MADE AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE 
FEE SCHEDULE, AND SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED THE NEED FOR THE FEES, 
BUT IF THEY ARE NECESSARY, THE SOURCE FOR THOSE FUNDS SHOULD BE 
THE GENERAL TAX FUND AND NOT FROM FEES OR FROM THE TAXFAYERS. 
MR. FILLMORE STATED BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, LEGISLATORS. 
TAXPAYERS, THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, AND THE AREA COUNCIL DO NOT 
FEEL FEES ARE NECESSARY. MR. FILLMORE REPRESENTED THAT SENATOR 
HAVEN BARLOW STATED THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE 
LEGISLATURE IN 26-24-H, UCA, TO ESTABLISH A PROCEDURE FOR FEE 
COLLECTION, AND THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD REVIEW THAT SECTION FOR 
CLARIFICATION. MR. FILLMORE MENTIONED THAT NONE OF THE BOARD 
MEMBERS WERE PRESENT FOR THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD SEPTEMBER 10, 
19B6, AND HE QUESTIONED HOW THEY COULD, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE, VOTE 
ON A PROPOSAL THAT HAD NOT BEEN CLEARLY DISCUSSED. 
GARY ATKIN, ATTORNEY FOR UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, STATED 
THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPROACH TAKEN ON IMPOSITION OF 
FEES. HE DID NOT FEEL BOARD MEMBERS WERE AWARE OF THE FEELINGS 
OF RESTAURANT OWNERS AND THE OPPOSITION TO THE FEES AT THIS 
STAGE. 
r?p,r>7 PflifW 
RESTAURANT 
FEES 
GENERAL DISSATISFACTION WAS EXPRESSED ABOUT THE PUBLIC 
HEARING. HR. ATKIN STATED THAT THERE WAS NO BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION DISCUSSED, AND NO ONE REALLY ANSWERED THE QUESTION 
WHY FEES NEEDED TO BE IMPOSED. THIS INSPECTION SHOULD BE PAID 
FOR BY TAXES OR TAKEN OUT OF THE BUDGET. NOTHING WAS STATED AS 
TO WHY THE AMOUNT OF FEES WERE NECESSARY, NOR HOW THE FEES WERE 
DETERMINED. MR. ATKIN CITED A COMPARISON BETWEEN FEES FOR DAY 
CARE AND NURSING HOMES, AND RESTAURANTS. THE QUESTION WAS ASKED 
HOW THE COST TO THE RESTAURANT WAS DETERMINED. FOR EXAMPLE, 
WHAT IS THE DIFERENCE BETWEEN A RESTAURANT WITH ONE CASH 
REGISTER AND 10 TABLES AND A RESTAURANT WITH TWO CASH REGISTERS 
AND 10 TABLES. HOW IS THAT FEE DETERMINED? MR. ATKIN STATED 
THAT NONE OF THESE FACTORS HAD BEEN PRESENTED AT THIS STAGE. 
THE HEARING OFFICER SHOULD HAVE PRESENTED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FOLLOWING THE HEARING. NONE OF THE NEGATIVE 
FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED. THE IDEA OF A FUBLIC HEAPING IS 
TO CONSIDER ALL THESE THINGS AND LET PEOPLE ASK QUESTIONS, BUT 
THE ONLY THING THEY WERE TOLD WAS THAT FEES WOULD BE IMPOSED. 
THE QUESTION, "WHAT DO YOU HAVE TO SAY ABOUT IT?" SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ASKED. 
MR. ATKIN STATED THAT THE FEE WAS INAPPROPRIATE AND THE ACTION 
TAKEN WAS QUESTIONABLE. HE STATED THEY HAD BEEN THROUGH THIS 
WITH DAVIS COUNTY, AND RESORTED TO THE COURT TO SETTLE THE 
ISSUE, AND HE REALIZES THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY HAS AN ADVISOR JUST 
AS DAVIS COUNTY DID, AND WE WANT TO BE SURE AND "WE WANT TO BEND 
OVER BACKWARDS AND MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE CROSSED OUR Ts AND 
DOTTED OUR Is". WE NEED TO BE SURE WHERE THE FEES ARE GOING TO 
GO AND WHAT TO EXPECT SO THERE IS NO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT. 
BILL DAVIS STATED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THE CONCERN OF THE 
RESTAURANT OWNERS, BUT THE DEPARTMENT HAD GONE THROUGH THE 
PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE NEED AS WE HAVE EXPERIENCED COSTS IN 
THE PROGRAM AND STILL FELT THE MEED TO SUPPLEMENT THROUGH FEES. 
THIS IS A MANDATORY PROGRAM THAT IS DONE SIMILAR TO THE 
ASBESTOS PROGRAM. ADOFTION OF FEES AS A PART OF REGULATIONS 
DATES BACK TO 19B1 WHEN FEES WERE INSTITUTED FOR SOLID WASTE. 
SINCE THAT TIME FEES HAVE ALSO BEEN INSTITUTED FOR OTHER 
INSPECTIONS. MR. DAVIS STATED THE CONCEPT IS THAT FUNDING 
SHOULD COME FROM GENERAL TAXES, BUT IF THAT WILL NOT SUFFORT 
PROGRAMS, THE USER FEE IS A REASONABLE WAY TO HELP SUPPORT THE 
COST OF THE PROGRAM. WE BELIEVE THOSE COSTS WILL PE CARRIED 
THROUGH TO THE CONSUMER FOR USE OF SERVICE. 
AS TO THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE, STAFF FELT THE FEE WAS VERY 
REASONABLE AND DETERMINED NOT TO GO FOR THE FULL AMOUNT OF THE 
COST OF THE PROGRAM BEING SUPPORTED BY THE FEE. A PORTION OF 
THE FEE WAS BUDGETARILY ACCEPTABLE TO THE STAFF, AND THE 
RESTAURANT CAN PASS THE FEE ON TO THE CONSUMER. 
STAFF DID MAKE AN EFFORT TO GAIN INPUT. THIRTY DAYS WERE 
ALLOWED FOR COMMENTS PRIOR TO THE PUBLIC HEARING. 
THE PROPOSED FEE WAS DISCUSSED WITH THE BOARD, AND AN EFFORT 
WAS HADE TO GAIN INPUT AS PART OF THE PUBLIC HEARING FRQCESS. 
STAFF FELT THEY HAD FOLLOWED THE SUPREME COURT GUIDELIIIES WHICH 
OUTLINED PROCEDURES THAT SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. A SPECIFIC ACCOUNT 
HAS INCLUDED IN THE BUDGET AND THE FEE HILL BE ALLOCATED TO THAT 
ACCOUNT. RECORDS HILL BE KEPT TO SHOW WHERE FEE COLLECTIONS GO 
AND WHAT THE FUNDS ARE SPENT FOR. 
DR. BEVAN ASKED IF STAFF KNEW HOW MUCH MONEY THIS FEE WOL'LD 
RAISE, HOW MUCH THE SERVICE COSTS, AND WHAT PORTION OF THE COST 
WOULD BE RAISED THROUGH FEE COLLECTION. DR. GIBBOUS RESPONDED 
THAT FEES WOULD PRODUCE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN HALF THE COST OF THE 
PROGRAM. ALL OTHER PROGRAMS ARE APPROXIMATELY 507. FUNDED BY 
FEES. A FEE IS CHARGED FOR IMMUNIZATIONS, AND THE INSPECTION 
AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM IS TOTALLY SUPPORTED BY FEES. 
TAMARA HHARTON STATED THAT THE FEE IS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF 
RISING COSTS AND LOSS OF FEDERAL MONEY. SHE FELT IT WAS 
UNFORTUNATE THAT A TASK FORCE WAS NOT SET UP TO STUDY THIS, BUT 
REVIEW OF THE MATERIAL REVEALED THAT CALIFORNIA, NEVADA AMD 
NEBRASKA HAVE CHARGED FEES FOR YEARS. PEOPLE ARE REALLY TED UP 
HITH BEING TAXED AND TAXED, AND SHE FEELS THERE SHOULD BE A 
FEE. THERE HERE SOME CONCERNS EXPRESSED THAT THE FEE WOULD 
SKYROCKET, BUT DR. GIBBONS STATED THAT STAFF WORKS CLOSELY WITH 
THE BOARD, AND COULD NOT INCREASE THE FEE HITHOUT BOARD 
APPROVAL. 
RON MORGAN, UTAH RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION, STATED THE BASIC 
L .!•.;,-- St*? 
OBJECTION OF THE ASSOCIATION WAS THEY ARE TOLD THE HEALTH 
DEPARTMENT IS COMING TO INSPECT OUR RESTAURANTS AND THEY 
THEREFORE FEEL THE COST SHOULD BE PAID FROM THE GENERAL FUND. 
IF WE LOOK BACK HISTORICALLY, WE FIND FEES START OUT VERY SMALL 
AND THEN BEGIN TO EXPAND. THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION IS HOT 
ONLY LOOKING AT TODAY, BUT FIVE TO TEN YEARS FROM TODAY. IF 
HEALTH IS INSPECTING AT OUR REQUEST, THEY SHOULD CHARGE US. 
TWO MEMBERS OF THE STATE SENATE WERE PRESENT AT THE HEARING AND 
BOTH SAID THAT IT WAS NOT THE INTENT OF THE LEGISLATURE TO 
PROVIDE FOR FEES. THE INTENT WAS TO CHARGE THOSE FEOOLC WHO 
COME AND PROVIDE A SERVICE FOR MYSELF OR MY FAMILY. AT THAT 
POINT IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CHARGE A FEE. MR. MORGAN FELT THE 
HEALTH DEPARTMENT STAFF CONVEYED THE IDEA, "WE REALLY DON'T CARE 
WHAT YOU GUYS SAY". THE RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION WENT TO THE 
SUPREME COURT ABOUT THESE ISSUES, AND IF THE BOARD OF HEALTH 
IMPOSES THIS FEE,THE ASSOCIATION WILL GO BACK TO THE SUPREME 
COURT ON THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ISSUES. THE LEGISLATURE, 
IN JANUARY, WILL SAY IT WA5 NOT OUR INTENT FOR THIS TO HAPPEN. 
DOUGLAS SMITH COMMENTED THAT MR. MORGAN'S SUPPOSITION ABOUT WHAT 
THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGISLATURE WOULD DO WAS GUESTIMATE AT 
BEST, AND HE DID NOT FEEL THAT SUPPOSITION APPLIED TO THE 
ADOPTION OF THIS FEE. A QUESTION WAS RAISED ABOUT THE 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RESTAURANT ORGANIZATIONS AMD A BANK. A 
BANK IS EXAMINED REGULARLY AND IS REGULATED FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF THE DEPOSITOR. MR. MORGAN COUNTERED THAT BANKS ARE EXAMINED 
IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE. BANKS ARE EXAMINED 
AND PAY A FEE TO PROTECT THE DEPOSITORS TO MAKE SURE THE 
DEPOSITS ARE SECURED. RESTAURANTS SHOULD BE INSPECTED TO MAKE 
CERTAIN THAT ACTIONS BEING TAKEN ARE IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE 
PUBLIC. MR. MORGAN CITED A RECENT CONTACT WITH THE STATE 
REGARDING SUMMIT SAVINGS. BANKS ARE EXAMINED SO THEY CAN 
OUALIFY FOR FEDERAL INSURANCE. THIS IS FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
THE DEPOSITORS. 
MR. MORGAN STATED THAT THEY WANTED TO CLARIFY TWO OR THREE 
POINTS THAT DID NOT GET THROUGH AT THE PUBLIC HEARING. 
DICK BOLLARD STATED THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS MANDATED TO PERFORM 
INSPECTIONS AND RECEIVES FEES FROM OTHER PROGRAMS, AND IT DOES 
NOT SEEM THAT HEALTH IS SINGLING OUT THE RESTAURANT 
ASSOCIATION. MR. BOLLARD WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SUFREME COURT 
RULING AGAINST DAVIS COUNTY WAS ON A TECHNICALITY RESULTING FROM 
A PROCEDURAL ERROR. THE INTENT TO COLLECT FEES WAS NOT REALLY 
OBJECTED TO IN THAT ACTION. 
PAUL MC CLURE STATED THAT HE COULD FEEL FOR THE RESTAURANT 
ASSOCIATION BECAUSE HE OPERATES A BUSINESS AND COSTS ARE VERY 
CRITICAL TO BUSINESSMEN. AN ORGANIZATION TO WHICH HE BELONGS 
RECENTLY VOTED ON THE ISSUE OF FEES ON A NATIONAL LEVEL. MR. 
MC CLURE DIRECTED THAT THE RECORD SHOW THAT HE IS OPPOSED TO 
USER FEES, AND THAT HE FEELS AS A GOVERNMENT AND COUNTRY, WE 
HAVE GONE OVERBOARD IN REGULATIONS AND ASSESSING FEES. 
UPON MOTION OF DR. JOHN SEVAN, THE 
BOARD VOTED TO ACCEPT THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO INSTITUTE USER 
FEES FOR RESTAURANT INSPECTIONS. 
MR. MC CLURE OPPOSED THE MOTION. 
CINDY GUST-JENSON ABSTAINED FROM, 
THE VOTE. 
m&n s#T 
SALT LAKE CITY-COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT 
FOOD SERVICE/FOOD ESTABLISHMENT 
LICENSING FEE STANDARDS 
FINDING OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Salt Lake City-County Health Department carries out responsibilities 
of food inspection in Salt Lake County. This authority is granted to 
the Salt Lake City-County Health Department by the Local Health Department 
Act of the Utah Code Annotated Title 26, Chapter 24. 
2. Section 26-24-14(14) allows local health departments to charge fees to 
carry out its responsibility. 
3. On September 10, 1986, a public hearing was held in order to receive 
public comment regarding the fees. Notice of the public hearing was 
advertised August 10 and 23, 1986, in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret 
News at-least 15 days prior to the public hearing. 
4. A summary of comments received at the public hearing was presented to 
the Board of Health at its regular scheduled Board of Health Meeting on 
October 2, 1986. 
5. While objection was raised by several individuals as to the charging 
of the fees, no information was brought forward which demonstrated that 
the proposed fees standard was contrary to state or local laws, was 
excessive, or not tied directly to the cost of the inspection program 
and to be used to support this cost. 
6. The Board finds that the proposed Food Inspection Fee Standard is 
consistent with the charging of fees in other Salt Lake City-County Health 
Department regulations such as the Asbestos Regulation, Massage Parlor 
Regulations, Swimming Pool Regulations, etc., and that the proposed fee 
does not single out food establishments in the charging of fees. 
7. The actual cost of the Food Inspection Program at the Salt Lake City-County 
Health Department is $453,000. Current fees for food handler perr.itc total 
$25,000. Cost of the Food Inspection Program not covered by current fees 
totals $430,000. 
8. The proposed fee schedule will generate approximately $156,000, v/hich is 
approximately one-third the total cost of the Food Inspection Program. 
9. Money collected by the proposed fee will be deposited in an account of 
the Health fund set up specifically to receive monies generated by the 
proposed standard. 
10. Funding to support the Food Inspection Program will be drawn from the 
account mentioned above in Item #9. 
GOO 
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The Salt Lake City-County Board of Health, therefore, concludes that 
the proposed food fees are reasonable and consistent with other fees 
charged by the Department, that proper procedures have been followed in 
developing the fees pursuant to Section 26-24-20, that the proposed fees 
will be used to support the Food Inspection Program, and that the fees are 
legal and meet the intent of Section 26-24-14. Therefore, the Board adopts 
the fees standard as attached this 2nd day of October , 1986. 
son, M.D., Chairman 
City-County Board of Health 
0< 
EXiiltui 
STAFF RESPONSE TO COMMENTS AT THE PUBLIC HEARING HELD 
SEPTEMBER 10, 1986 
This paper combines and summarizes the comments made at the 
hearing related to the proposed food service inspection fees and 
gives the response of the Health Department staff to these comments 
-1MENT: 
r\FF RESPONSE; 
)MMENT: 
rAFF RESPONSE: 
The food service industry is barely making a profit. 
This fee will cause a detrimental effect en profits and 
a loss of business and jobs. 
The staff was reas 
fee standard. The 
$100.00 per year f 
ments, which have 
square feet of flo 
figures to be. $1. 3 
To be even more re 
fee would cost a f 
At the rates propo 
a significant detr 
jobs. 
onable in the amounts proposed for the 
maximum amount to be charged is 
or Category IV or Category V establish-
76 or more seats or 5,COO or more 
or space. At the most, this amount 
2 per seat or two cents a square foot, 
alistic, we estimate that the annual 
raction of one cent per meal served, 
sed, we believe the fee will not be-
iment in lost profits, business or 
The purpose of the inspection is to protect the public; 
therefore, the burden of cost should be born by the 
public and the general tax. Tax increases should come 
from the regular budget process. 
It is true the purpose of the food service inspection 
is to protect the public but in this case, as it is in 
many other cases, it is not the general public that is 
causing the threat of foodborne illness. The "public" 
creating the potential problem should carry primary 
responsibility to prevent it. We believe, however, sup-
port for the fee will ultimately come from the general 
public or customers of food establishments as the cost 
is passed on to them through the meals or food purchased, 
As James V. Olsen, President of that Utah Retail Grocers 
Association, stated in his hearing comments, "...the 
businesses are forced to pass on these costs of doing 
business to their customers through higher prices". The 
cost that will be passed on will be minute. 
If it was the intent of the Utah State Legislature thru 
the Local Health Department Act Section 26-24-16 that 
only general tax dollars be the source of funding for 
local health departments, it appears they are creating 
a contradiction in Section 26-24-14(14). If Section 
26-24-14(14) was intended only for the establishment of 
fees where a direct benefit is received (e.g., fee for 
a birth certificate), it does not so state, and, if the 
ooo' 
legislature cecides .;* * ui& law ^ ; lirtit fees 
only to direct benefit., . r wi * make it necessary for 
local health departments to snift the source_of fundinc 
tc he property tax. If this shift causes an increas-
in property tax, the public would be ooposed, :re 
so than th^ imposi* , ^ ^  
of thp p! 
view 3H 
fcibur»; :e;.t^: il.e 
leve the point of v: 
*^ . cruris tc . n a budgv; , •: «.... ii.r;, . - : ~ >: 
regular budget process have been exnaustec, altrougn we 
never dismiss this alternative in evaluating our pro-
grams. The County Commission feels they have received 
a clear Dublin T-^-i-> - *-r * rrooerty taxes net le raised 
COMMENT; A special Mi^up of businesses have beer, s.rgiea w. 
required tr ••*• ^ .-cectec. - • ;i tr>-~. charged for the 
inspectior 
STAFF RESPONSE: 
MMENT: 
The u:;c, 
mission wher-
i t s e I ^  
but n,. 
have i: 
la ted 01 fjse usi 
basis, the food se 
ou+~ Permit or in 
1 i -' -'Ji ~ 1 * \; the 
sage establishment 
pools, solid waste 
inspections, and t 
schedule ir t v ! * 
now goinc through 
tency r; n the pub 
of those already c 
the fnnH ^ndustr 
Rather than ;:,; > — 
efficiency, u t* 
belt. 
\r a r\ A intent - f 
_ , is to have e 
not oily in Salt ~ 
. ha'< i rees *=uppor 
suppor ted either 
ng the service. In 
rvi:e .n iastr\ is n 
spection fees have 
d partment for asbe 
s, bar re' and reaut 
haulers and t icili 
a11oo establishment 
- \, '.g facility regu 
the public coursent 
lie point of view a 
barged for a fee wo 
mould n!~n assume 
.rr. supper : 
' and Utj-
each program and 
DV those be.ng regu 
es tablishing this 
z\ being singled 
already beer esta"-
s tos control, mat 
y shops, swimming 
ties, septic tank 
s. TM-re is a fee 
lation. which is 
procesc. Co n s i s-
nd the point cf vie*-
uld dictate that 
part rf r^ o -os t. 
:ect :vene: 
. _u increase 
and tighten its 
\FF RESPONSE: T::e department has always arn! wil. continue : :>***.'•• .^f -
adopt efficiencies prior t .* ^ki ;g bu : ,- - .ncreasei 
The department'F reputatic - clear tr _ts budget sub-
mitted each year is a "bare nones" Mid In 1970, Salt 
Lake County's population was 480, t -.3-
increased over 700,000. Food «^ laonsnments ha\ e 
increased 5-8% per year and now totals 3,000. The 
National Environmental Health Association recommends an 
average workload of 150 food establishments per sarn-
\.:rian. Our workload is 250. 
'•••P-0' 
With this remarkable increase in workload, the Food Pro-
tection Program has not had an increase in staff in the 
past 10 years. Rather, the excellence of the-program 
has been maintained through efficiencies and creative 
management. A number of efficiencies were.created with 
the computerized "SPIF" (Sanitation Program Information 
Formulator) Program. This program provides timely and 
meaningful data for each sanitarian. Food establishments 
that receive a low score receive greater attention and 
more frequent inspections, data is easily collected, 
tabulated and reported, inspection patterns and scores 
are readily available, and time sequences for reinspec-
tions are determined. Other efforts to "tighten our 
belt" have included cutting the inspection program for 
preschools and nursing homes and not picking up inspec-
tions of group homes, hourly day care facilities, 
extended care facilities and halfway houses. 
As an alternative to the department training all food 
handlers, a food establishment has the option of having 
its manager trained and the manager, in turn, training 
his employees. Unfortunately, few food establishments 
have implemented their own training program. 
Other agencies, both in and out of county government, 
have reviewed the department and its individual programs. 
Those reviews may be summed up in a statement in a March, 
1986, report by the Utah Foundation. It states, "Expen-
ditures of the Salt Lake City-County Health Division in 
1984 appear significantly less than expenditures of 1974, 
if the 1974 figures are adjusted for inflation and the 
increased number of people served. Over the same period, 
health services appear to have approximately doubled.". 
ZOMMENT: The fee is an unfair tax and tax increase. The food 
industry already pays taxes, license fees, and food 
handler permits to support the Food Protection budget. 
STAFF RESPONSE: The inspection fee is not a tax and it is not unfair or 
hidden. Authority to establish the fee is based on 
Section 26-24-14(14) of the Utah Code Annotated (Local 
Health Department Act). An individual often does not 
know what is included in his tax statement, where the 
taxes are going and how they are being spent. The food 
inspection fee on the other hand is a specific amount, 
the payer of the fee knows what it is for and should see 
a direct result. The fee is earmarked and can be spent 
for no other purpose. There is a specific accounting 
and auditing procedure set up to handle the fee and 
determine its efficiency. 
Even though the food service industry pays other taxes, 
those taxes are not intended to cover the costs of the 
000'^ 
Health Department . ., -s defray the cost of t-" 
municipal and county agencies but no license fee mone 
goes to the Health Department, Food handler_permit fet 
are not paid by the food establishment. They are pail 
by the individual emplovpe when he/she H- *^ •<* *, c 
COMMENT: imposi: , • •? wiii. c. precedent that other heal 
departme*-* follov. T*ned in Davi^ fount" and 
STAFF RESPONSE: Imposing a pexmit _r
 Aasp»-. let :J uuver * - e cost:. 
of the department is not a ne* precedent. It ^as alrea 
been in practice several other programs with. cur 
Department and by other local health departmer.t" :ve 
local health departments, including Tooele County, Eear 
River District, Southeastern Health District, W-asatcr; 
County and Utah County, have set fees. The fees we ha\ 
set are comparable to those being proposed in these ctr 
jurisdictions considering the size of the depar4"-0-*- -• 
number r-.r -r *: ?/: 1 i shme^t - er.:v jurisdiction. 
To say that the ec -*. oc^e r.. . ed that a ret v. .::..._•. oe 
imposed because of rh* Davis - unty attempt is incorre 
That attempt failed because specific lega" :i >JC.:J. 
were not followed in establishing the fee, ree^ can be 
imposed if the legal procedures are followed. The Utar 
State Supreme Court ruled that in promulgating a fee, 
standard findings of fact should be entered that are 
comprehensive eno..c allow determination if the fees 
have been designe.i ana collected to actually defray some 
or all of the cos's of inspecting food service establis* 
ments. The Boar: : Health and the staff -*-*» *-* :-••'; 
these leg .a - :' • 'ecures. 
2(yAfAVtvrz Once the fee . • imposed, -. *. ~ill escc-' - . ' nue 
to increase. 
»Tiniii i wr.'il'UN'.jL. To assume ". : • „ . . -rrease .-. .., - 3 continued 
source of hr.pjn; ieiray inspection c:^l ;:. jnrealistir 
However, i * ihi. \AU be kept m x.nd that the Hea^1: 
Department :• ::r^"tice of net increasing fees- ha- 5t^.. 
outstanding. ase in point ib _.._ .r.i^ k lr-spectior. :^ 
which has not *,.jreased in the past 8 year.. ^ sertr.. 
focd inspection fees, any subsequent increases will be 
by the Board of Health ot the staff. The Board has 
always been sensitive • -leeds of :\ose affected by 
the fee increase. 
Thursday Morning, September 23. 1982 
Section A p a g e f a 
Food Service Inspection Fees 
Are Necessary Health Step 
In the area of public health 
protection, food service inspection 
should have top priority. There are 
more reported outbreaks of disease 
associated with food consumption 
than from all other environmental 
causes combined, according to the 
Utah State Health Department. 
But inspection staffs in the state's 
12 health districts historically have 
been grossly understaffed due to lack 
of funds. The result has been fewer 
inspections of public eating establish-
ments, sometimes only once a year 
rather than the legally-required once 
every six months, particularly in 
multi-county districts where great 
travel distances are involved. 
In a 1972 survey, 45 percent of the' 
food service outlets in Utah were 
rated "inadequate" and, by law, 
could have been ordered closed for 
health reasons. A Bureau of Sanita-
tion survey just completed shows 
significant improvement overall, but 
restaurants scored worse than 
schools or taverns. .<; '• 
The national formula for adequate 
health protection is one sanitarian 
per 15,000 population. On that basis, 
Utah is 41 sanitarians short. Davis 
County now has only five and should 
have 11. 
To help defray the cost of inspec-
tions and build up the program, Davis 
County Department of Health has 
taken a long-needed step of charging 
public food outlets a modest annual 
service fee. The Utah Restaurant 
Association is fighting the action, 
seeking a court injunction. '« • 
The Davis County move stems from 
tightened state purse strings in recent 
years and follows a course outlined by 
the legislature. 
The burgeoning budget of the Utah 
Department of Health the past de-
cade, necessitated by growing state 
and federal demands on it, was 
deeply slashed below requests the 
past two general sessions. So deeply 
the previous health director resigned 
in protest that the department's 
mandatory responsibilities could not 
be carried out with the reduced 
appropriations. It was a case of slash 
vital services and the public be 
damned or assess fees to maintain 
them. • .
 : *. . .
r 
In response, the legislature in 1981 
authorized the health department to 
charge for publications and services 
previously provided free. In protest-
ing the Davis County fees, the 
executive director of the restaurant 
, association contends it was not the 
legislature's intent to include restaur-
ants in a fee system. But they are not 
exempted in the new law. It states 
broadly that "the department may 
adopt a schedule of fees that may be 
assessed for services rendered by the 
department, provided that such fees 
shall be reasonable and fair . . ." 
The Davis County schedule ap-
pears reasonable and fair, fees based 
on size and number of operating days 
annually, expected to cost each 
eating establishment between $15 
and $60 a year. That should impose no 
• hardship on restaurant owners. 
There is ample precedent in 
charging the private sector for public 
services their activities necessitate. 
Builders pay for septic tank inspec-
tions and other services. Industry 
pays for health department review of 
pollution control plans. The dairy 
business pays inspection fees. 
,The new restaurant fees are an 
appropiate investment in public 
health. The inspection program is 
essential and should be brought up to 
full strength rather than drift into 
neglect through lack of money. 
EXHIBIT 
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being regulated by State and Federal Law, and the companies already comply with 
those regulations. Mr. Bird complimented the Board in their efforts in 
developing the Regulations. 
Upon motion of Richard Bollard, seconded 
by Douglas Smith, the Board unanimously 
voted to accept the proposed changes and 
adopt Asbestos Regulations. Staff will 
be required to present an annual report 
to the Board. 
Food Terry Sadler reported that a few years ago restaurant fees were 
Establish- discussed, but no action was taken because Utah Restaurant 
inent Association filed a lawsuit. The District Court suit was 
Licensing appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, and a ruling was handed down 
Fees that Davis County did not follow protocol with their public 
hearing. The court did not rule on fees. California, Nevada 
and Texas, as well as other states, already charge fees. Mr. 
Sadler circulated an information sheet which listed various 
categories, definitions, and respective fees for the named 
categories. 
Staff met with Mr. Ron Horgan of Utah Restaurant Association and 
Mr. Jim Olson of Utah Retail Grocers Association to discuss a 
user fee. Every food establishment that is inspected should be 
charged a reasonable fee. Mr. Sadler estimated cost of food 
inspections to be approximately $600,000. Health presently 
generates approximately $50,000, but it is anticipated that 
$150,000 could be generated if collection of fees were to be 
instituted. Dr. John Bevan stated he felt inspections of food 
establishments was very appropriate and that a fee should be 
charged. 
Upon motion of Dr. John Bevan, 
seconded by Jan Green, the Board 
unanimously voted to approve a public 
hearing for restaurant inspection fees. 
Inspection of food dispensed through vending machines was also 
discussed. Those foods are inspected at the packaging site. 
Douglas Smith inquired about food handling and sanitation in 
those instances where corporations, partnerships and companies 
invite clients to their establishment and serve food, but are 
not really set up to handle groups. Is dishwashing adequate, and 
is sanitation by those handling the food adequate? He feels 
these establishments should also be subject to food inspections. 
Dr. Gibbons stated this would be a matter for future 
consideration by the Food Division. 
Fee Kent Fitzgerald circulated information relating to proposed 
Increases increases in fees. The information included a description of the 
ooo^i 
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• - Wednesday, September 11), PJHli, n e he ld a p u b l i c h e a r i n g 
and completed a 30-day comment p e r i o d on t h e Proposed Food Estab 
l i shment I n s p e c t i o n Fees . I am e n c l o s i n g , f o r your review, ft- r> 
fo l lowing : 
1. II III mi i mi in in in in • i l l III II mi in in mi III in mi I III 
2. Minutes of the public hearing (copies of llit* written comments 
submitted a I the hearing are AIM i Lihlo upon request) 
3. A draft copy of the conclusions of law and findings of f act 
th.if are necessary an pmf «m f thr Mile-making process, 
4 An outline of the issues raised U i I hose making comments 
•mil staff respoir.e to those comment.!. 
impression 1 received from snmo of the comments leads 
^xeve that there are many individuals who do not under-
-e great effort we have made to maintain an efficient and 
active food protection.program, including the efforts our 
Committee who reviews our programs,, sets pri orities and 
*..*.- tax dollars are spent wisely. 
We can be proud of our Food Protection Program. It serves 
i wital public health need in Salt Lake County and has been an 
Iilary program, not only for Utah, but is so recognized in 
many areas of the United States, Filling the existing need ! ,, 
not been easy. We have maintained excellence, but we feel we 
have economized to the point public health may be jeopardized. 
We have not had an increase in food protection staff in the f: JS! 
J 0 years, yet today we inspect 3 .000 food establishments compared 
ooof 
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to 2,000 that existed 12 years ago. The past few years we have 
been experiencing a 5-8% growth rate in establishments, not 
taking into account the increase and workload created by tempo-
rary events such as the Utah Arts Festival, neighborhood fairs, 
holiday parades and celebrations and other mass gatherings. 
During the 1970's, 30C of every food dollar spent was in a food 
establishment. During the 1980*8 this figure has risen to 40C 
and by 1990 is expected to rise to 50C. Last year, because of 
improper food handling at a single event, there was a confirmed 
foodborne illness affecting 300 people. The threat of foodborne 
illness is ever present. 
Our efforts as a health department to economize and become 
more efficient will continue. As I have stated in recent Board 
Meetings, however, I strongly feel the need for this inspection 
fee to be adopted so the maintenance of an excellent program may 
continue. Please review the enclosed documents carefully. If 
you have any questions, comments or suggestions, please contact 
me. 
Sincerely, 
M.D., M.P.H, 
HLG/WLD/bc 
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